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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
The main question to be discussed in this paper is whether non-reductive physicalism 
with the commitment to mental causation can survive Jaegwon Kim's 
supervenience/exclusion argument. Non-reductive physicalists, on the one hand, share 
the physicalist commitment to mind-body supervenience and physical causal closure; 
on the other hand, they think that mental properties are causally efficacious but not 
reducible to physical properties. Kim's supervenience/exclusion argument attempts to 
show that non-reductive physicalism is not tenable. A physicalist cannot sensibly 
maintain both the irreducibility and the causal efficacy of mental properties. 
In this paper, I am going to deal with two responses to Kim's argument. According to 
the first response, Kim's argument depends on an idiosyncratic sense of causation, in 
which causation is viewed as a generative or productive process, which however is not 
the sense of causation that is relevant to the debate on mental causation. Rather, the 
relevant sense of causation should be the dependence conception. Furthermore； it is 
argued that, given the dependence conception, the exclusion problem can easily be 
solved. The second response is from Stephen Yablo. He thinks that non-reductive 
physicalists can solve the exclusion problem by understanding mental properties as the 
determinables of physical properties. 














不合理。相反，以依附關係來理解因果關係(dependence conception of causation)更 
加合理，而若把因果關係理解為依附關係，心靈特質是否有因果效力的問題亦迎刃 
而解。 
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Chapter 1: The problem of mental causation for 
physicalism 
1.1 Mental causation—introduction to the problem 
We always experience mental causation in our daily life. When I suddenly recall 
memories of my campus life during my undergraduate years, the episodes make me 
feel happy. My thoughts cause me to have certain feelings. These are cases of 
mental-mental causation. When we watch a film, some episodes of the film make us 
feel excited, some make us feel sad, and so on. This is a case of physical-mental 
causation; i.e., the light from the screen, the sounds, and so forth, cause us to have 
different feelings. When a boy is in love, he wants to express his love to a girl; thus, he 
goes out to buy her a rose and a card. His wish causes his body to perform in a certain 
way. This is a case of mental-physical causation. We are very familiar with the three 
kinds of mental causation: mental-mental, mental-physical, and physical-mental 
causation. 
What is the problem of mental causation? It is misleading to speak of "the" 
problem of mental causation. Roughly speaking, the problem of mental causation is the 
problem concerning how the mind can causally interact with the physical body. It 
sounds as if there is only one problem of mental causation. However, this is not the 
case. Different views on the nature of the mind lead to different sets of mental 
causation problems. 
Suppose we are substance dualists like Descartes—we think that we are 
substantial, immaterial souls with physical bodies. The problem of mental causation for 
us would be "how can the mind, which is a significantly different kind of substance 
from the physical entities, causally interact with the physical body?" This problem, 
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according to most contemporary philosophers of mind, is fatal to substance dualism. 
Whether this problem is fatal to substance dualism is not my concern in this paper. In 
this paper, we are going to discuss a mental causation problem, namely, the exclusion 
problem, for non-reductive physicalism. 
1.2 The problem of mental causation for physicalism 
1.2.1 A brief introduction to physicalism—layered model, supervenience, and 
physical closure 
What is physicalism? Jaegwon Kim has defined it as follows: 
The core of contemporary physicalism is the idea that all things 
that exist in this world are bits of matter and structures 
aggregated out of bits of matter, all behaving in accordance with 
laws of physics, and that any phenomenon of the world can be 
physically explained if it can be explained at all. (Kim 2005: 
149-150) 
Physicalism denies substance dual ism/ A physicalist is a monist in the sense that 
he/she believes that there is only one kind of substance, i.e., physical substances. 
Physical substances include, at the fundamental level, elementary particles like quarks 
and electrons. Other entities like energy and force may also be involved.^ According to 
1 Some Christian scholars, like Nancey Murphy, consider themselves as physicalists. Physicalism, 
according to them, is a view only applicable to mundane objects. But they do not deny the existence of 
an immaterial God. What I mean by physicalism in this paper makes a stronger claim, namely the claim 
that there are only physical objects in the world, which directly entails the nonexistence of God. Indeed, 
most contemporary physicalists accept this stronger claim. 
At different periods of time, people might have different views on what there is at the fundamental 
level of physics. Recently, a debate has arisen on whether there is such a thing as a fundamental level. 
But I would set debate aside since, even if there were no fundamental level, it would not be necessary to 
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physicalism, all things that exist,^ such as tables, computers, bodies, and so forth, are 
either complex physical substances having a specific configuration of a set of 
fundamental physical substances or simple physical substances. Physicalists distinguish 
different levels or different kinds of physical substances. For example, Hilary Putnam 
and Paul Oppenheim mentioned a multilayered model for distinguishing these kinds of 
physical substances. The model includes the following six levels: 
6. Social groups 




1. Elementary particles.� 
Different physicalists may have different views on how many levels there are, what 
properties characterize a level, and so on. In other words； they may not totally accept 
the above model. Indeed, one has to deal with many technical problems if one is to 
come up with a neat, clear, and comprehensive model. By setting aside details of the 
model, a physicalist can accept a multilayered model that at least somewhat resembles 
the one above. They should all be in agreement with the view that, if there is a 
fundamental level, that level should consist of the substances and properties that the 
best physical theory tells us are basic. 
make many refinements to my argument, and the issue would in any case not have much significance to 
the following discussion. 
3 Here I am not going to question whether physicalism allows for the existence of abstract entities. I 
simply assume that a physicalist may accept the existence of abstract entities other than physical 
substances. Certainly, physicalists may take any stance concerning this problem, e.g. fictionalism, and I 
will not discuss the issue. 
4 See Kim (2002a). 
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Furthermore, they should all agree that substances at different levels have 
different kinds of properties. The properties of the substances at level L(n) are in a 
certain sense dependent on the properties of substances at level L(n-l). For example, a 
dog is a living organism in that it has many biological properties, and these biological 
properties are determined by the properties of its cells. Contemporary philosophers 
usually call this dependence relation or determination relation "supervenience." 
Physicalism accepts that properties of L(n) supervene on the properties of L(n-l). 
Supervenience is a relation between two sets of properties.^ According to 
Jaegwon Kim, the relevant concept of supervenience should be "strong supervenience." 
Kim characterizes the strong supervenience of A-properties on B-properties as follows: 
Necessarily, for any object x and any property F in A, if x has F, then there exists a 
property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily if any y has G, it has F. (Kim 1993i: 
80) 
There are two senses of necessity: the nomical (or "nomological") sense and the 
metaphysical (or broadly logical) sense. The nomical sense of necessity is the necessity 
possessed by laws of nature. Given E=MC*C, and given a constant C, the relation 
between E and M is nomically necessary. When M =1, it is nomically necessary that 
E=C*C. 
Metaphysical necessity is a stronger sense of necessity. Even though E=MC*C is 
nomically necessary, it is not metaphysically necessary. It is possible that there exists a 
world with a totally different set of laws of nature. "Water is H20" is well known to be 
metaphysically necessary, so is 1+1=2. If it is metaphysically necessary that water is 
H20, there cannot be a world in which water is not H20. 
5 But they do not have to be two sets of properties at different levels. 
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Given the two senses of necessity, there can be more than one sense of 
supervenience regarding the formulation above, depending on how we interpret the 
modal operators.® 
Strictly speaking, supervenience is not an asymmetrical relation. While 
A-properties supervene on B-properties, B-properties may also supervene on 
B-properties. However, in the discussion about mental causation, it is always assumed 
that if A-properties supervene on B-properties, A-properties are dependent on, or 
determined by, B-properties in the sense that B-properties have a prior ontological 
status. In the following, I will also accept this assumption. 
If A-properties supervene on B-properties, then B-properties are the 
supervenience base of A-properties. Going back to our claim that physicalism accepts 
the supervenience of properties of L(n) on the properties of L(n-l), a physicalist needs 
not claim that every property at level L(n) only has one single supervenience base at 
level L(n-l). It can be the case that property P of L(n) has more than one supervenience 
base at L(n-l); i.e., one instance of P is necessitated by property G1 at L(n-l), but 
another instance is necessitated by G2. What is guaranteed by the claim that 
properties of L(n) supervene on properties of L(n-l) is that: 
(1) if two possible worlds are the same at level L(n-l), they are also the same at level 
L(n); 
(2) every property at L(n) has at least one supervience base at L(n-l) in every possible 
world, unless L(n) is the fundamental level. 
6 One must note that there are other concepts of supervenience such as global supervenience and 
weak supervenience, each of which has several formulations. Since the consensus is that one minimal 
requirement in accepting physicalism is to accept strong supervenience between mental properties and 
physical properties, I will not explain weak supervenience and global supervenience in this paper. For 
more details, see Kim (1993). 
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Here, possible worlds, just like necessity, can be understood as nomically possible 
worlds or metaphysically possible worlds. 
We have clarified the concept of supervenience above. It should be noted that a 
physicalist need not affirm the same supervenience thesis for all levels of properties. A 
physicalist may claim that the properties at L(2) (strongly) supervene on properties at 
L ( l ) in the sense of nomological necessity, but that properties at L(4) only supervene on 
properties at L(3) in the sense of metaphysical necessity, and so on. 
Thus far, we have clarified the ontological picture of physicalism. A physicalist 
thinks that there are only bits of matter in our world; the configurations of the matter 
categorize the physical substances, either complex or simple, into different levels. The 
properties at different levels supervene on the properties at lower levels, unless they 
are the properties that characterize the fundamental level. 
A physicalist has another important basic commitment. According to Kim, a 
physicalist thinks that the physical world is causally complete (Kim 2005: 149-150). This 
means that every physical event that has a cause at time t will have a sufficient physical 
cause at t. This is known as the causal closure of the physical domain. Causal closure of 
the physical domain tells us that when we need to know the cause of a physical event, 
we need not appeal to anything beyond the physical realm or look anywhere else than 
there. Certainly, closure does not hold at every level of the physical world; a biological 
event might not have a "biological cause." For example, the emergence of the first cell, 
according to some Darwinists, is caused by some chemical reaction at the molecular 
level. But closure holds, at least, at the fundamental level. 
1.2.2 What is the mind from a physicalist perspective? 
12 
What is the mind from a physicalist perspective? Certainly, it cannot be a distinct 
kind of substance. Indeed, it seems a bit misleading to ask the question of what the 
mind is from a physicalist perspective, as if mind is something substantial. Usually, 
physicalists talk about mental phenomena (or mental properties). They treat mental 
phenomena as phenomena of a higher-level reality. From a physicalist perspective, 
mind is only the characteristics, features, or capacities^ of some higher-level physical 
substances; i.e., properties of physical substances. Clearly, physicalists think this way 
because the best physical theory we have today does not explain microphysical 
phenomena in terms of mental properties. Mental properties are not the properties 
that characterize the fundamental level. Rather, if mental properties are real, they 
must be those that characterize a higher level of the physical reality； which supervene 
on the physical properties at lower levels. This is a basic commitment of physicalism, 
which is called the mind-body supervenience. According to Kim, the following 
mind-body supervenience is one of the minimal commitments of a physicalist: 
Mental properties supervene on physical/biological 
properties. That is, if any system s instantiates a mental 
property M at t, there necessarily exists a physical property P 
such that s instantiates P at t, and necessarily anything 
instantiating P at any time instantiates M at that time. (Kim 
2005: 33)8 
7 Kim 2006: 6. 
8 According to Frank Jackson (see Jackson 1998: 11-14), the supervenience thesis that captures the 
essential claim of physicalism is the following: 
(B) Any world that is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our world. 
While I think Kim is correct, since the objection to Kim that I am going to discuss is not about the 
formulation of supervenience, I will set aside questions on whether the mind-body supervenience thesis 
formulated by Kim is really a minimal physicalist commitment. I will simply assume that it is and will not 
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What makes a property mental? I cannot think of a good answer here. For the 
purposes of this paper, a definite answer is not needed. Mental properties, in this 
paper, refer either to prepositional attitudes like desires, beliefs, and other kinds of 
thoughts; or to phenomenal qualities like itching, pain, sadness, anger, and the like. 
When you are feeling pain or thinking about something, for example, you are 
instantiating mental properties. 
1.3 Non-reductive physicalism stated 
1.3.1 Comrrdtments and generally accepted claim of physicalism 
Concerning the problem of causation to be discussed, as mentioned above, a 
physicalist is committed to the following two claims. First, to the causal closure of the 
physical domain: 
If a physical event has a cause at t, it has a sufficient physical cause at t. 
Second； to the mind-body supervenience: 
Mental properties supervene on physical/biological properties. That is, if any 
system s instantiates a mental property M at t, there necessarily exists a physical 
property P such that s instantiates P at t, and necessarily anything instantiating P 
at any time instantiates M at that time. (Kim 2005: 33) 
argue for it. I will also set aside such questions as how strongly the supervenience thesis should be 
formulated, how the different formulations are related to each other, and the like. For other 
formulations of strong supervenience, see (McLauglin 1995). 
14 
Besides the two basic commitments, most, if not all, physicalists accept that mental 
properties are causally efficacious. Reductive physicalists believe that mental 
properties simply are physical properties. As physical properties are causally efficacious, 
mental properties should also have causal efficacy. What about non-reductive 
physicalists? The aim of developing non-reductive physicalism is to preserve the 
autonomy of the mental realm; i.e., there are mental properties possessing causal 
powers that are distinct from those of physical properties. The aim of preserving the 
autonomy of the mental realm is: (1) to provide a distinct realm for psychology as a 
science; and (2) to save agency, i.e., to save the possibility of a human person 
performing certain actions according to how he feels, what he thinks, and so on. Thus, 
a satisfactory non-reductive physicalist account of the mind cannot deny that one can 
really cause something by virtue of one's mental properties. Therefore, most 
physicalists, like ordinary people, believe that: 
Mental properties are causally efficacious to the physical world. 
1.3.2 Reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism 
Most； if not all, physicalists, including both non-reductive and reductive physicalists, 
accept the above three theses.^ Both non-reductive and reductive physicalists accept 
the basic ontological commitment mentioned in sec. 1.2. What distinguishes them is 
that non-reductive physicalists think that mental properties are not reducible to the 
physical properties, while reductive physicalists think otherwise. 
What is meant by the saying, "Mental properties are reducible to physical 
properties"? According to Kim and J. J. C. S m a r t , t h e fundamental idea of the 
9 There are exceptions, like the eliminative materialists. But their view is extremely unpopular. 
See Smart, J. J. C (1959). 
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irreducibility of the mental to the physical is that "mental properties are something 
'over-and-above' the physical properties.� 
What "over-and above" means can be illustrated as follows. Suppose I have a list 
that includes all of the physical properties (both micro- and macro) instantiated by 
Kobe Bryant at time t, such as his height, his weight, his neural states, his health 
condition, the location of all of the atoms that constitute his body, and so on. Would 
the list be sufficient to fully describe Kobe Bryant at t, or is something missing? 
A non-reductive physicalist would think that something is missing since the full 
list of physical properties does not include mental properties. In this sense, mental 
properties are something over and above physical properties. 
By contrast, a reductive physicalist would think that nothing is missing, as he 
would think that the mental properties of Kobe Bryant could in some way be identified 
with his physical properties. For example, his "feeling pain" could be identified with his 
C-fiber firing, or his belief that "I used to be the NBA regular season MVP" could simply 
be the physical state that fulfills certain functional roles in his neural system, and so on. 
Some might dispute the above understanding of the reducibility of the mental, 
since the above characterization of the reducibility of the mental might suggest an 
ontological difference between non-reductive physicalism and reductive physicalism; 
namely, non-reductive physicalists seem to accept that there are some non-physical 
facts that are over and above the physical facts. 
There should be no significant ontological difference between non-reductive 
physicalism and reductive physicalism. To avoid the possibility of that kind of 
misunderstanding, I would characterize the distinction between non-reductive 
physicalism and reductive physicalism in the following way. Non-reductive physicalists 
think that mental-predicate terms pick out genuine properties that are distinct from 
physical properties. Reductive physicalists think that mental predicate terms simply 
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pick out physical properties, not something distinct from physical properties. 
Simply speaking, there are two conceptions of properties: the abundant 
conception and the sparse conception. According to the abundant conception, "every 
predicate corresponds to a property" (Loewer 2007: 245). According to the sparse 
conception, however, not every predicate corresponds to a property. Whether a 
predicate corresponds to a genuine property depends on whether the predicate occurs 
in causal laws or laws that are sufficient for grounding causal relations. If the predicate 
term occurs in such a law, then that predicate term corresponds to a genuine property, 
which can be called a sparse property. 
Both reductive physicalists and non-reductive physicalists accept that some 
mental phenomena exhibit a law-like relation with other mental phenomena and 
physical phenomena. In this sense, both reductive physicalists and non-reductive 
physicalists accept that there are psychophysical laws and psychological laws.u 
For illustration, let us assume that the following is a genuine law: 
(L) Whenever S is in pain, S will make noise of kind N. 
We further assume that pain can only be realized by C-fiber firing and P-fiber 
firing, and that C-fiber firing and P-fiber firing are genuine sparse properties. 
A non-reductive physicalist would simply take (L) to be a law that grounds causal 
relations. Thus, the predicate term "being in pain" corresponds to a genuine property. 
A reductive physicalist however, does not think that (L) is a law that grounds 
causal relations. He thinks that only the fundamental physical laws are laws grounding 
causal relations. Suppose Brian makes noise of kind K when he is in pain. What is 
11 Some physicalists, most notably Davidson, argue that there are there are no strict psychophysical laws 
and psychological laws. But it seems that no physicalists, with the exception of eliminativists, deny the 
existence of ceteris paribus psychophysical laws and psychological laws. 
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revealed is that it is, say, Brian's C-fiber firing that is causing Brian to make the noise. 
Does Brian's pain cause Brian's noise? According to reductive physicalism； it does only 
if Brian's pain is Brian's C-fiber firing. Different reductive physicalists would give 
different answers on how Brian's pain is Brian's C-fiber firing. 
Concerning the discussion on mental causation, I think that non-reductive 
physicalism can be understood as the idea that mental predicates pick out mental 
properties that are genuine sparse properties but are not identical to any physical 
properties. In this sense, mental properties are not physical properties. On the other 
hand, reductive physicalism can be understood as the idea that mental predicates do 
not pick out mental properties that are genuine sparse properties but are not identical 
to any physical properties. Rather, they only pick out physical properties, which, no 
doubt, are genuine sparse properties. In this sense, mental properties are physical 
properties. 
Everyone agrees that if all mental properties are type-type identical to physical 
properties, then all mental predicates pick out physical properties. Some might argue 
that type-type identity need not be the only condition for mental predicates to pick out 
physical properties. As Karen Bennett pointed out, some philosophers, like David Lewis, 
argue that while mental properties are not type-type identical to physical properties 
due to the multiple realizability of mental properties, the terms referring to mental 
types should perhaps be understood as non-rigid designators or definite descriptions/^ 
Kim also argues for a model of reduction called functional reduction, in which a mental 
property need not be type-type identical to a physical property, even though the 
mental property can be reducible to physical properties/^ Now we know in what sense 
12 See Karen Bennett (2008: 285). 
13 My argument in the following does not depend on my characterization of reductive and non-reductive 
physicalism. My argument is not affected even if I accept that mental properties are reducible to physical 
properties if and only if they are type-type identical. But I insist on my characterization for two reasons. 
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a non-reductive physicalist accepts the following claim: 
Mental properties are irreducible to physical p r o p e r t i e s , 
1.3.3 The non-reductive physicalist's view on mental causation 
Thus, non-reductive physicalists share the two basic commitments of physicalism: (1) 
physical causal closure and (2) the mind-body supervenience. Also, they accept that: (3) 
mental properties are irreducible to physical properties, and (4) mental properties are 
First, my characterization does justice to Kim, who thinks that mental properties are multiply realizable 
(such that they are not type-type identical to physical properties), but reducible to physical properties. 
Indeed, no one considers Kim to be a non-reductive physicalist. Second, my characterization helps to 
shed light on one point of genuine disagreement between non-reductive physicalists and reductive 
physicalists, namely, whether psychophysical (and psychological laws) can be considered as causal laws 
or laws that ground causal relations. 
14 If one accepts that mental properties are not physical properties and the Kimian theory of events, one 
should accept the following: 
"Mental events are distinct from physical events." (Loewer, 2002: 656) 
It is important to distinguish between two accounts of events, the Davidsonian event and the Kimian 
event/4 since the above statement can be attributed to non-reductive physicalism only if we 
understand events in the Kimian sense. Kim understands an event as an instantiation of a property by 
certain substance(s) at a particular time, with the form [s, P, t], while s stands for the substance, P stands 
for the property instantiated, and t stands for the time that s instantiates P. Given this understanding of 
event, an event e l is causally efficacious to another event e2 in virtue of the property being instantiated 
by the substance in el. Since an event is an instantiation of a property, an event, at the same time, is 
called a property instance. If there is an event in which property Q is instantiated, this event is a Q 
instance. 
According to Kim, whether e l and e2 are the same event depends on whether the same set of 
substances, properties, and time are involved (in e l and e2). Kim's criterion for the identity of events is 
as follows: 
[si, PI, t l ] = [s2, P2, t2] iff (sl=s2) & (P1=P2) & (tl=t2). 
A Davidsonian event, unlike a Kimian event, is a simple particular, which can instantiate different 
properties (in a full-blooded Davidsonian ontological scheme, there are only descriptions but no 
properties). Such a scheme is widely rejected, and the talk about properties is much more popular in the 
literature; furthermore, the difference between description and property does not seem to be important 
here. Therefore, I will join the talk about properties here and set aside the full-blooded Davidsonian 
scheme). Non-reductive physicalism based on Davidsonian events can accept that a mental event m is 
the same event as the physical event, but it would allow for the possibility that m causes a certain effect 
E in virtue of the physical property P, but not in virtue of the mental property M. 
In the following, unless stated otherwise, I understand event in the Kimian sense. 
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causally efficacious (to the physical world). 
We now have the four core theses of standard non-reductive physicalism 
concerning mental causation. The four theses seem to offer an appealing picture of 
physicalism. One the one hand, it preserves the autonomy of the mental realm; on the 
other hand, the world is neat because physical closure is also preserved. 
1.4. What is next? 
However, Kim thinks that standard non-reductive physicalism is untenable. A 
physicalist has to deny either (3), and thus accept reductive physicalism; or (4), and 
thus accept epiphenomenalism.^^ This is the well-known supervenience/exclusion 
argument, which is the topic of the following chapters. 
Now, we know what the mental causation problem for physicalism that we are 
going to discuss is: How can mental properties be causally efficacious to the physical 
world (given the causal closure of the physical domain)? In other words, how can 
mental events cause changes to the physical world (which is causally closed) in virtue of 
their mental properties?^^ This problem can be called the exclusion problem. 
In the following chapter, I am going to state and clarify Kim's argument. 
15 I doubt whether epiphenomenalism is a coherent option for a non-reductive physicalist. As far as I 
know, the relevant conception of property in the discussion is sparse conception. If so, there should be 
no properties without causal efficacy. Thus, it sounds incoherent to say that there are mental properties 
that are not causally efficacious. 
16 In fact, there are other mental causation problems for physicalism, e.g., the extrinsicness of mental 
properties. But they are not the focus of this paper. 
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Chapter 2: Kim's supervienience/exclusion 
argument against non-reductive physicalism 
2.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter 1, there are three kinds of mental causation: mental-mental, 
mental-physical, and physical-mental. Certainly, physicalists want to accept that they 
are all real, since we all experience them every day. 
Jerry Fodor once said that: 
I'm not really convinced that it matters very much whether the 
mental is physical; still less that it matters very much whether we 
can prove that it is. Whereas, if it isn't literally true that my 
wanting is causally responsible for my reaching, and my itching is 
causally responsible for my scratching, and my believing is 
causally responsible for my saying if none of that is literally true, 
then practically everything I believe about anything is false and it's 
the end of the world. (Fodor 1990: 153) 
1 think Fodor is right that the non-existence of mental causation would be a terrible 
disaster. If there is no mental-mental causation, there is no inference; if there is no 
mental-physical causation, there is no agency; if there is no physical-mental causation, 
there is no perception. If we deny mental causation, we are, at the same time, denying 
that we can be responsible for what we do. More significantly, denying 
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mental-causation strongly undercuts the trustworthiness of our cognitive faculties. 
In this chapter, I will clarify Jaegwon Kim's challenge against non-reductive 
physicalism. If Kim's challenge works, and if physicalism is true, "whether the mental is 
physical" is closely related to whether "my wanting is causally responsible for my 
reaching, and my itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and my believing is 
causally responsible for my saying...." 
Surely, different non-reductive physicalists would fill in different details in their 
accounts of non-reductive physicalism. To name only a few, they may hold the 
constitutional view, champion certain forms of functionalism, and so on. These details 
are not significant here. What is more important is that non-reductive physicalists 
accept the four basic commitments mentioned in the last chapter, and that those basic 
commitments seem to be sufficient to seriously challenge non-reductive physicalism. 
Kim argues that, the four basic commitments, together with the causal exclusion 
principle, are incoherent. 
2.2 Supervenience argument 
Kim has been discussing the exclusion problem for over twenty years. The formulation 
of his argument against non-reductive physicalism is not always the same. In this 
chapter, what I am trying to do is to formulate Kim's argument in a way that fits best 
with his current view.^^ I will also follow the labeling of the most up-to-date works of 
Kim. 
Here we may start from the supervenience argument. Kim introduces his 
supervenience argument as follows: 
17 The main references of my formulation will be (Kim 1998), (Kim 2005), and (Kim 2006). 
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This argument, which we may call the "supervenience 
argument/' shows that mental to mental causation is possible 
only if mental-to physical causation is possible. (More 
generally, we may say that "same-level" causation entails 
"downward" causation.) (Kim 2006: 199) 
We may set aside the general problem about "same-level" causation and 
"downward" causation and focus on his argument about mental to mental causation 
and mental-physical causation. First of all, suppose that there is a mental event m* at t, 
which is supposed to be caused by another mental event m. So we have: 
(1) m causes m* at t. 
Given the mind-body supervenience thesis that is formulated as follows: 
Mental properties supervene on physical/biological 
properties. That is, if any system s instantiates a mental 
property M at t, there necessarily exists a physical property P 
such that s instantiates P at t, and necessarily anything 
instantiating P at any time instantiates M at that time. (Kim 
2005: 33). 
The mental properties instantiated in m and m* (let us call them M and M � 
respectively) should be supervenient upon physical properties, such that m* is 
necessitated by the instantiation of, let us say, P*. From this, we get: 
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(2) M* supervenes on P*. 
Since (1) and (2), m* is caused by m on the one hand, and on the other hand, m* is 
necessitated by the instantiation of P*, let us say, p*. According to Kim, we have a 
conflict here. Why does m* occur? Is it because of p* or m? In response to this, his 
view is that: 
The only way to harmonize the two claims seems to be this: 
M caused M* to instantiate by causing M*'s supervenience 
base P* to instantiate. (Kim 2006: 198-199) 
If this really is the only way to harmonize the two claims, then it follows that the only 
way for m to cause m* is to cause p*. 
There is another way for Kim to get the conclusion he wants. Namely: 
In general, it seems like a plausible principle to say that to 
cause, or causally affect, a supervenient property, you must 
cause, or tinker with, its supervenient base properties. (Kim 
2006: 199) 
And, 
To cause a supervenient property to be instantiated you 
must cause its base property (or one of its base properties) 
to be instantiated. (Kim 1998: 42) 
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The principle sounds quite plausible. For example, given that the aesthetic properties 
of paintings supervene on their physical properties, the only way to cause changes to 
the aesthetic properties of paintings is to cause changes to their physical properties/^ 
Based on the principle, Kim should agree with the following: 
(3) If M* supervenes on P*, then m causes m* at t only if m causes p* at t. 
(1), (2), and (3) together logically entails: 
(4) m causes p* at t. 
That is the supervenience argument. The argument is clearly valid, and I think that a 
physicalist would agree that it is sound. 
2.3 Exclusion argument 
Now we move to the exclusion argument. This is where most of the controversies lie. 
This argument attempts to show that if one accepts both the irreducibility of the 
mental (to the physical) and the causal closure of the physical domain, then one cannot 
sensibly accept the existence of mental-physical causation. The argument goes as 
follows: First of all, suppose that: 
(4) m causes p* at t. 
p* is a physical event. Given the causal closure of the physical domain, p* must have a 
18 See Kim (1998:43). 
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sufficient physical cause at t. Let us call this p. Thus, (4) and the causal closure of the 
physical domain together entail that: 
(5) p causes p* at t. 
Could m be the same event as p? A non-reductive physicalist's answer should be no. 
Since mental events should be distinct from physical events, m can therefore not be 
the same event as p. Thus, a non-reductive physicalist should accept that p* has two 
distinct causes, namely, m and p. 
Kim, at this stage, inserts the causal exclusion principle, which says: 
"If an event e has a sufficient cause c at t, no event at t distinct 
from c can be a cause of e, unless this is a genuine case of causal 
overdetermination)." (Kim 2005: 
If the causal exclusion principle is correct, then if cases of mental-physical causation are 
not genuine cases of overdetermination, either p or m must therefore be excluded as 
the cause of p*. Are cases of mental causation genuine cases of overdetermination? 
What qualifies as a genuine case of causal overdetermination? One case is always 
mentioned. Two bullets, B1 and B2 at once, one from the left and the other from the 
right, shoot a man. The two bullets hit the man at the same time, and both of them are 
fatal to the man. The death of the man has two distinct causes: from the shot by B1 
and the shot by B2. 
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In Kim (2005: 42), Kim stated the exclusion principle differently, as follows: "No single event can have 
more than one sufficient cause occurring at any given time—unless it is a genuine case of causal 
overdetermination." 
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Are the cases in mental causation similar enough to this genuine case of causal 
overdetermination? The answer is no. In the bullets-and-man case, the two distinct 
causes are nomologically independent. However, in the cases of mental causation, the 
mental events are supervenient on the physical events, so m is, at least, nomologically 
dependent on p (and the dependence relation might be even stronger), given that m is 
relevant to the causal story of p. As Kim said: 
In standard cases of overdetermination, like two bullets hitting 
the victim's heart at the same time ... each overdetermining 
cause plays a distinct and distinctive causal role. The usual 
notion of overdetermination involves two or more separate and 
independent causal chains intersecting at a common effect. 
Because of the [mind-body] Supervenience, however, that is not 
the kind of situation we have here. (Kim 2005: 48) 
Thus, according to Kim: 
(7) Mental causation is not a genuine case of causal overdetermination. 
Given (7) and the causal exclusion principle, (6) must be false; thus, either m or p is not 
a genuine cause for p*. Certainly, Kim thinks that m should be disqualified as the cause 
of p. To disqualify p as the cause of p* is to allow the violation the causal closure of the 
physical domain, which is unacceptable to physicalists. 
Thus, if Kim's argument is correct, to preserve the distinctness between m and p, the 
genuine cause for p* has to be the physical cause p, but not m. If that is the case, m is 
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only epiphenomena in the causal story of p causing p*. Kim's argument can certainly be 
generalized to cover all cases of mental-physical causation. Therefore, if one accepts 
physicalism (and thus accepts mind-body supervenience and the causal-closure of the 
physical domain) and the irreducibility of the mental to the physical, one has to admit 
that mental properties are not causally efficacious to the physical world. Thus, one 
would have to admit that mental-physical causation does not exist. 
2.4 Implications of the supervenience/exclusion argument 
If the exclusion argument is correct, this would show that non-reductive physicalism 
cannot accommodate mental-physical causation. Recall the supervenience argument, 
which shows that given mind-body supervenience there is mental-mental causation 
only if there is mental-physical causation. If non-reductive physicalism cannot 
accommodate mental-physical causation, mental-mental causation will also be 
challenged. Therefore, the two arguments together show that non-reductive 
physicalism cannot accommodate both the mental-mental and mental-physical 
causations. As Kim said: 
See where the two arguments, the exclusion argument and 
the supervenience argument, lead us. According to the 
supervenience argument, mental-to-mental causation is 
possible only if mental-to physical causation is possible. But 
the exclusion argument says that mental-to-physical 
causation is not possible. So it follows that neither 
mental-to-mental nor mental-to physical causation is 
possible. This goes beyond the epiphenomenalism of 
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mental-to-physical causation; the two arguments together 
show that mental events have no causal efficacy at all - that 
is, no power to cause any event, mental or physical. (Kim 
2006:199) 
Clearly, this is not a tolerable stance on mental causation. If the 
supervenience/exclusion argument (the combination of the two arguments) is correct, 
Kim's challenge to non-reductive physicalism is a fatal one. Indeed, as long as the 
exclusion argument is sound, it is troubling enough for a non-reductive physicalist, 
since the denial of mental-to-physical causation is also intolerable. Hence, according to 
Kim, to preserve the reality and causal efficacy of mental properties, the only 
acceptable stance for physicalists is to reduce them to physical properties. 
2.5 Objections to the supervenience/exclusion argument 
How would non-reductive physicalists respond to Kim's argument? There are many 
responses. Kim categorized most of the criticisms to the supervenience/exclusion 
argument that had been raised, as follows:^^ 
1) The generalization objection. It is argued that if the supervenience/exclusion 
argument is sound, then there will be no downward causation in general, which is 
absurd. Thus, the supervenience/exclusion argument must be problematic. 
2) The causal drainage argument. Ned Block argued that if the supervenience/exclusion 
20 Kim's final conclusion, strictly speaking, is not reductive physicalism. He thinks that intentional 
properties can be physically reduced, but phenomenal properties cannot. See Kim (2005: 173-174). Thus, 
as he thinks that not all mental properties are physically reducible, this would disqualify him from being 
a reductive physicalist. 
21 See Kim (2009: 42-46). 
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argument is sound, then if there is no fundamental level in the physical world, there 
would be no causal relation. This result is absurd; thus the argument must be 
problematic. 
3) The objection that Kim's argument depends on a specific notion of causation. This 
argument is championed by Barry Loewer, who argues that Kim's argument is based on 
his understanding of causation as a process of production/generation. Appealing to this 
very notion of causation, according to Loewer, is problematic on the one hand, and 
unnecessary on the other. 
4) Similar to 3), the fourth objection says that there are other accounts of causation 
that can resolve the supervenience/exclusion argument. 
I tend to take (3) and (4) together as one objection. Objection (3) claims that the 
production conception of causation is problematic and unnecessary for formulating the 
supervenience/exclusion argument. Objection (4) seems to be supplementary to (3). If 
objection (4) is correct, this would explain why the production conception is not 
necessary, since objection (4) argues that the dependence conception is a good, and 
even better, choice for understanding mental causation. 
5) The overdetermination objection. This objection is that it is not problematic to 
understand mental causation as overdetermination. 
There are objections not mentioned by Kim, including: 
6) The dual-explananda solution. This objection takes events as Davidsonian events. It 
30 
claims that in any cases of mental causation, the cause, m, and the effect e are two 
events； each of which possesses different properties (or descriptions); e.g., while event 
m possesses a mental property M and a physical property P, event e possesses a 
mental property M' and a physical property P'. This solution says that if m causes e, M 
of m is responsible for causing IVT of e, and P of m is responsible for causing P' of e. if 
so, mental properties have a clear causal role. 
7) The objection from determinates and determinables proposed by Stephen Yablo. It 
is claimed that understanding the relations between mental and physical properties as 
determinables and determinates helps to preserve the causal efficacy of mental 
properties. 
I am not going to discuss all of the objections to the supervenience/exclusion argument 
in this thesis. As I see it, very good responses have been made to objections (1) and 
(2),22 so, these two criticisms will not be discussed in this thesis. Objection (6), will not 
be discuss either, since, personally, I do not think that it is a forceful argument. Only 
objection (3) (together with (4)) and objection (7) will be discussed. As I see it, (3) 
(together with (4)) is the most widely accepted solution among non-reductive 
physicalists. While (7) is widely rejected, I think it is an interesting and original response 
on its own. 
So far, I think that objections (3) and (7) are the most promising ways for 
non-reductive physicalists to respond to the supervenience/exclusion argument. If one 
is cautious enough, one can easily see that almost all of Kim's crucial premises in his 
supervenience/exclusion argument are the basic commitments of non-reductive 
physicalism. The causal exclusion principle is the only exception. Therefore, if a 
See Kim (2005: 52-69). 
31 
non-reductive physicalist were to resist Kim's challenge, it would be natural to deny the 
causal exclusion principle. Why should a non-reductive physicalist accept that the 
causal exclusion principle? Does Kim have a good argument for this? Kim's argument 
for the causal exclusion principle will be the topic of the next chapter. 
32 
Chapter 3: Kim on the principle of 
causal/explanatory exclusion 
3.1 Introduction 
In the following, we will focus on Kim's view of the causal/explanatory exclusion 
principle. 
With regard to his argument for the causal/explanatory exclusion principle, Kim 
refers us to his earlier paper, Mechanism, Purpose and Explanatory Exclusion. The 
principle being argued for in that paper is the principle of explanatory exclusion, not 
the principle of causal exclusion. We will first try to understand Kim's argument for 
explanatory exclusion, before attempting to determine the relationship between the 
explanatory exclusion principle and the causal exclusion principle. 
In the above mentioned paper, Kim continued the debate between Norman 
Malcolm and Alvin Goldman on whether an action can be given both a physical (or 
mechanical) explanation and a mental (or purposive) explanation. Malcolm said no, but 
Goldman said yes. Kim argued for Malcolm's side. Kim's stance, roughly, is that, "no 
event can be given more than one complete and independent explanation" (Kim 1993: 
239). It may be that standard cases of overdetermination should be considered 
exceptional cases to Kim's stance. Indeed, Kim's stance on whether there are two 
complete and independent explanations in a standard case of overdetermination was 
unclear. On the one hand, he seemed to think that in a standard case of 
overdetermination, both causes should be included in one complete explanation. He 
said: 
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It isn't obvious in cases like these just how we should formulate 
an explanation of why or how the overdetermined event came 
about; however, it is not implausible to think that failing to 
mention either of the overdetermining causes gives a misleading 
and incomplete picture of what happened, and that both causes 
should figure in any complete explanation of the event. (Kim 1993: 
252) 
On the other hand, he allowed standard cases of overdetermination as exceptional 
cases. He said, 
If... this is a classic case of overdetermination ... we can treat this 
case as one in which either explanation alone is incomplete, or 
else exempt all overdeterminative cases from the requirement of 
explanatory exclusion. (Kim 1993: 253) 
I will assume that Kim allowed standard cases of overdetermination as exceptional 
cases to his explanatory exclusion principle in order to weaken the principle and make 
arguments involving the principle easier to be motivated. Therefore, I assume that 
Kim's purpose was to argue for the following principle of explanatory exclusion: 
No event can be given more than one complete and 
independent explanation, unless it is a standard case of 
overdetermination. 
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While the principle may also apply to other types of explanation, in the following I will 
only focus on the causal explanation. Therefore, more accurately； the principle to be 
discussed is this: 
No event can be given more than one complete and 
independent causal explanation, unless it is a standard case of 
overdetermination. 
3.2 Kim's realist commitment 
According to Kim, explanatory knowledge is a kind of propositional knowledge. 
Therefore, the explanatory relation is a relation between propositions. Thus, when C 
explains E, both C are E are propositions about the occurrence of event c and event e, 
and "C explains E" is another proposition that can be either true or false. 
Under what condition(s) is the proposition "C explains E" true? Kim thought that 
the truth of that sentence should be grounded by some objective facts. Thus, C explains 
E is true only if event c and event e have satisfied an objective relation R. An objective 
relation, according to Kim, should be understood as follows: 
By an "objective relation", I have in mind a relation that at least 
meets the following condition: that it is instantiated does not 
entail anything about the existence or nonexistence of any 
intentional psychological state - in particular, an epistemological 
or doxastic state - except, of course, when it is instantiated by 
such states. (Kim: 198, 226) 
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Thus, whether C explains E depends on whether c satisfies a certain objective relation 
with e. This view is called explanatory realism. We may consider the implications of 
explanatory realism for the causal explanation. 
In cases of causal explanation, C explains E only if c causes e. Given explanatory 
realism, the causal relation between c and e must be an objective relation in the above 
sense. Therefore, c and e must be events that have objectively occurred in the world, 
and there should be an objective causal structure between c and e that is to be 
discovered or described by the correct theory or sentences. The proposition "C explains 
E" is true only if "C explains E" correctly describes that objective causal relation 
between c and e. 
Here, Kim was not committed to the claim that the descriptions of c and e, i.e. the 
contents of C and E, are irrelevant to whether the explanation is a good one. Rather, he 
may agree that for C to be a good explanation of E, C and E should be a certain type of 
description of event c and e, so that certain internal relations are satisfied, such as the 
logical coherence of C and E and the relevant explanatory theory. In fact, Kim is 
committed to a criterion of the individuation of events that can make sense of claims 
about whether certain explanations are the same, even though their semantic contents 
differ. In other words, Kim is committed to a criterion of the individuation of events 
such that one can sensibly claim that while " C I explains El" and "C2 explains E2" are 
not logically equivalent propositions, they can be talking about the same explanatory 
relation. In cases of causal relations, the criterion allows two propositions to be talking 
about the same causal relation. 
3.3 Kim's argument for explanatory exclusion 
In the last section, we see Kim's realist commitments, including his explanatory realism, 
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i.e., the truth of a piece of explanatory knowledge is grounded on the objective 
explanation between events; and causal realism, i.e., causation is an objective relation. 
Given this background, we may continue to discuss Kim's argument for explanatory 
exclusio 门. 
Suppose explanation C I cites c l as the cause of e and explanation C2 cites c2 as the 
cause of e. If so, c l and c2 may be related in the following ways:^^ 
(1) c l = c2. While C l and C2 are logically inequivalent, they are citing the same cause. If 
so, C l and C2 are not two complete and independent explanations. 
(2) c l is distinct from c2, but in some clear sense reducible to, or supervenient on c2. 
Since c l is dependent on c2, we do not have two independent and complete 
explanations; rather, c l is in a clear sense dependent on c2 and, thus, C l is dependent 
on C2. 
(3) Neither c l nor c2 is a sufficient cause of e, but both c l and c2 are components of 
the sufficient cause. Since, according to Kim, "a complete explanation specifies a 
sufficient set of causal conditions for the explanadum" (Kim, 1993: 251), neither C l nor 
C2 is itself an independent and complete explanation. 
(4) c l is a proper part of c2. In this case, C l is not itself an independent and complete 
explanation of e. 
(5) c l and c2 are different links of the same causal chain. It may be that c l causes c2, 
23 For details, see (Kim 1988: 233-235) and (Kim 1993: 250-252). 
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and then c2 causes e. In this case, c2 is dependent on c l , so we do not have two 
independent explanations. 
(6) c l and c2 are each a sufficient cause of e. In addition, they belong to different 
causal chains. Even if c l had not occurred, e would still occur because of c2. Also, even 
if c2 had not occurred, e would still occur because of c l . If so, this is a standard case of 
overdetermination. 
The six possibilities exhaust all the relevant options. Thus, after considering all of them, 
according to Kim, we may have an argument for the principle of explanatory exclusion. 
Consider (a) if c l had not occurred, e would still occur, (b) if c2 had not occurred, e 
would still occur. If both (a) and (b) are true, then it is a standard case of 
overdetermination. If at least one among (a) and (b) is false, then, Kim argues, it must 
be the case that if c l had not occurred, c2 would not have either^"^ (Kim 1993: 253), 
such that C l and C2 are not independent. Thus, C l and C2 cannot be two independent 
and complete explanations unless it is a standard case of overdetermination. 
3.4 From the principle of explanatory exclusion to the principle of causal 
exclusion 
Let us assume that by a "complete explanation" Kim means an explanation that 
"specifies a sufficient set of causal conditions for the explanadum" (Kim 1993: 253) 
rather than one that "specifies its [the effect's] entire causal history in every detail" 
(Kim 1988: 234). If so, given that no event could have more than one complete and 
independent explanation unless it is a standard case of overdetermination, explanatory 
24 It seems that Kim has made one minor mistake. If (3) is the case, then even if c l had not occurred, c2 
might still occur. However, c2 is not sufficient to cause e. This, however, does not affect his conclusion. 
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realism implies that if C is a complete explanation of E, then c is a sufficient cause of e 
at certain time t. If the preceding statements are true, unless it is a standard case of 
overdetermination, an event cannot have more than one sufficient and independent 
cause at time t. 
If, so far, the argument is unproblematic, we should get the following: 
(EEP) No event can have more than one sufficient and independent cause at t, 
unless it is a standard case of overdetermination. 
Compare EEP with the causal exclusion principle in Kim's exclusion argument. 
(CEP) No event can have more than one sufficient cause at t, unless it is a 
standard case of overdetermination. 
CEP is stronger than EEP. EEP does not say that an event cannot have two sufficient 
causes, given that one of them is dependent on the other. Therefore, EEP is quite 
compatible with non-reductive physicalism, since EEP does not rule out the possibility 
that both the mental cause m and physical cause p are sufficient causes of p* at time t, 
given that m is dependent on p. This possibility, however, is ruled out by CEP. 
At this m o m e n t it seems that Kim's argument for CEP is not quite sufficient, if the 
arguments mentioned above were all of Kim's reasons for CEP. What does Kim think 
about the possibility that there are two sufficient causes at the same time in which one 
is dependent on (in the sense of supervenient on, or reducible to) the other? 
3.5 Kim's view on non-standard overdetermination and how the gap between 
EEP and CEP is bridged 
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In his earlier paper on supervenient causation, Kim's view was that the so-called 
"macro-causation" between a G-instance and F-instance (at t) is not a genuine causal 
relation. Rather, it reveals that there is a genuine causal relation at a lower level, 
namely, the causal relation between m(G)—i.e., the instance of the micro-property, 
which is the supervenience base of the G-instance—and m(F). While G and F are 
properties supervenient upon the micro-properties m(G) and m(F), there is only one 
genuine causal chain between the instances of m(G) and m(F). The macro-causal 
relation between the G-instance and F-instance is thus reducible to the micro-causal 
relation between instances of m(G) and m(F). If so, in a case of macro-causation, there 
is only one causal process between m (G) and m(F). The G-instance, which is 
supervenient upon is not another sufficient cause of the F-instance (or an 
instance of m(F)) other than m(G). 
Why should we not consider both m (G) and G instances to be two distinct sufficient 
causes of the F-instance? We see Kim's view on this point in his response to Ned Block 
on whether we may treat both the cape's color and its provocativeness as two distinct 
sufficient causes of a bull's anger in the activity of bull-fighting. 
...in cases of standard overdetermination, the overdetermining 
causes are independent events—two or more independent causal 
chains, each causally sufficient, converge upon a single effect. In 
contrast, in the case of the cape's color and its provocativeness, 
we do not evidently have two independent causes: the 
Here, I am appealing to the notion of event supervenience. This is not difficult to understand given 
the Kimian view on events and strong supervenience. This view can be understood as follows: 
An event, x's having F, supervenes on the event x's having G, just in case x has G and G is a 
supervenience base of F. (Kim 1993j: 99) 
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instantiation of provocativeness, as a second-order property, is 
dependent on the instantiation of the color red. What isn't clear, 
however, is why this removes the difficulty: if the color of the cape 
is, in and of itself, a sufficient cause of the anger, what further 
causal work is left for its provocativeness? What special 
contribution of its own can the cape's provocativeness make in the 
causation of the anger? The answer obviously is none: given the 
color of the cape as a full cause, there is no additional causal work 
left for its provocativeness, or anything else. (Kim 1998: 53) 
Kim continued: 
The exclusion problem does not go away when we recognize the 
two purported causes as in some way dependent on the other. As 
long as they are recognized as distinct events, each claiming to be 
a full cause of a single event, the problem remains. ... The difficulty 
is exactly that the causal status of the dependent event is 
threatened by the event on which it depends. (Kim 1998: 53) 
It is clear that Kim did not think that the existence of two sufficient causes in which one 
is dependent one another is a genuine possibility. Kim's reason for denying that 
possibility, I think, can be articulated as follows: 
(A) If c is a cause of e at t, then c makes a distinct causal contribution (or it plays a 
distinct causal role) in causing e at t. 
(B) If c is dependent on c* (in the sense of supervenience and reduction), and c* is a full 
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cause26 of e at t, then c cannot make any distinct causal contribution in causing e at t. 
Thus, if c is dependent on c* (in the sense of supervenience and reduction), and c* is a 
full cause of e at t, then c is not a cause of e at t. 
If the above argument is sound, then the distinction between EEP and CEP is no longer 
significant. This is because, if the argument is sound, the "possibility" that both the 
mental cause m and the physical cause p are sufficient causes of p* at time t, given that 
m is dependent on p, is only a pseudo one. 
I would like to make one further note on the above argument. In the above 
argument, whether c is a sufficient cause or a partial cause is not relevant. As long as c* 
is a sufficient cause, and c is dependent on c* in the relevant sense, based on the 
argument, even if c is not purported to be a sufficient cause, c is still ruled out as a 
cause of e (at t). 
It seems that if the above argument is sound, together with EEP, CEP is well 
motivated. However, is the above argument well motivated? It seems that the above 
arguments, which I think can be properly attributed to Kim, have to be motivated by 
some specific view on causation. Without such a view, we cannot even make sense of 
such notions as "causal contribution," "causal w o r k , or "causal role."^^ Indeed, these 
notions do not seem to be clear to some philosophers, such as Tyler Burge: 
Kim asks, given that the physical cause is ' suf f ic ient�what 'work' 
remains for the mental cause. It is not clear to me what makes this 
question seem forceful to him. I am inclined to think that the 
Full cause simply means sufficient cause. 
27 As I see it, there are no significant differences between them. In the following, I will assume that they 
are the same. 
42 
question trades on unclarified notions of sufficiency and work. 
(Burge 2007:380) 
What exactly is Kim's view on causation? Does his view help to make sense of notions 
such as "causal contribution" and "causal work"? 
3.6 Kim's view on causation 
In the following, 1 do not intend to determine every detail of Kim's view on causation. 
My purpose is only to determine those features of his view on causation that I find 
relevant to his argument for CEP. I will try to stick to what Kim has said unless it 
becomes necessary to do otherwise. I will also attribute certain views to Kim that I 
think that he would probably accept, even though he has never affirmed them 
explicitly. 
In his later writings, Kim has often quoted Elizabeth Anscombe when explaining his 
conception of causation. She said: 
It is little attended to, and yet still so obvious as to seem trite. It is 
this: causation consists in the derivativeness of an effect from its 
cause. This is the core, the common feature of causality in its 
various kinds. Effects derive from, arise out of, come of, their 
cause. For example, everyone will grant that physical parenthood 
is a causal relation. (Anscombe 1993: 91-92) 
Very recently, he also quoted Ned Hall, who has argued that there are two 
fundamentally distinct notions of causation: dependence (to be discussed in sec. 4.2) 
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and production. According to Hall: 
...we evoke it when we say of event c that it helps to generate or 
bring about or produce another event e, and for that reason I call 
it production. (Hall 2004: 225) 
Hall characterized production according to three properties: transitivity, locality, and 
intrinsicness.28 What exactly transitivity and intrinsicness mean, and what their roles 
are in the discussion on the philosophy of causation need not bother us here. Indeed, 
these two characteristics need not be crucial to the production conception that Kim 
uses. What is more crucial, however, is locality. Kim thinks that cause and effect should 
exhibit a spatial-temporal continuity. This is exactly what locality means. In Kim's own 
words, the spatial-temporal relation serves as the pairing relation^^ that pairs up two 
events, such that one is the cause of the other, and the other is the effect. By pairing 
relation, Kim means the relation that grounds the causal relation between the cause 
and the effect. For example, we consider two guns, A and B. Two shots are set off 
simultaneously, leading to the simultaneous death of two persons, John and Mary. 
Presumably, the shot from A causes the death of one person, and the shot from B 
causes the death of another person. But the question is: what grounds are there for the 
claim that the shot from A caused the death of, say, Mary, but not John? Kim's answer 
is that there is a specific causal chain from the shot of A to the death of Mary. This 
causal chain is grounded by the specific spatial (or more plausibly, spatial-temporal) 
relation between the shot from A and the death of Mary. 
Transitivity says that if event a causes b, and if b causes c, then a causes c. Intrinsicness says, very 
roughly, that the causal structure of a process is "determined by its intrinsic, non-causal characters. See, 
Hall (2004: 225). For more details, see Hall (2004). 
29 See (Kim 2006: 44-48). 
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It is clear that, to Kim, spatial contiguity is one necessary condition for a causal 
relation. If so, to be a cause, an event must occupy a certain spatial-temporal location, 
such that it can generate/produce the effect through a spatial-temporal connection. 
We now turn to the idea of causal contribution. I think that we may understand 
the notion of causal contribution in the following way: 
A causal contribution of cause c to an effect is a specific causal effect e brought about 
by c through some spatial-temporal connection that satisfies spatial contiguity, such 
that c is solely responsible for the occurrence of e. 
This view on causal contribution fits quite well with Kim's view on standard cases of 
overdetermination. On the one hand, Kim affirms that it is necessary to make a distinct 
causal contribution to be a cause of something. One the other hand, he affirms that in 
a standard case of overdetermination, both causes are sufficient to the effect. Thus, he 
has to affirm that each of the sufficient, overdetermining causes has a distinct causal 
contribution, which is not shared by another equally sufficient, overdetermining cause, 
such that each sufficient cause has its own "further" or "additional" causal work to 
contribute to the effect. As Kim said: 
...each overdetermining cause plays a distinct and distinctive causal 
role. (Kim 2005: 48) 
I think my understanding of causal contribution sounds coherent with Kim's view, since 
my understanding can make sense of how both sufficient causes in a standard case of 
overdetermination can have its distinct causal contribution. 
Let us consider the following case: 
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Two bullets hit a person at the same time, and this kills the person, 
where each bullet would have sufficed to cause the death. (Kim 
2006:196) 
This is one standard case of overdetermination provided by Kim. In this case, the two 
sufficient causes are the two shots (both at time t). In my sense, a distinct causal 
contribution can be attributed to each cause, which is not shared by the other cause. 
For example, after the shots, there are two bullets inside the person, and there are two 
holes in his body. Each bullet (together with one hole) is brought about by one shot, 
but not the other, through a specific causal chain. 
Let us reconsider the above mentioned argument: 
(A) If c is a cause of e at t, then c makes a distinct causal contribution (or it plays a 
distinct causal role) in causing e at t. 
(B) If c is dependent on c* (in the sense of supervenience and reduction), and c* is a full 
cause of e at t, then c cannot make any distinct causal contribution in causing e at t. 
Thus, if c is dependent on c* (in the sense of supervenience and reduction), and c* is a 
full cause of e at t, then c is not a cause of e at t. 
If my view on causal contribution really is Kim's view, and if it is correct, then if c* is a 
sufficient cause of e, while c is dependent on c*, such that c does not occupy a distinct 
spatial-temporal location, it is really hard to imagine how c can generate the extra 
energy to generate an additional causal contribution. 
Thus, given Kim's view on causation, both (A) and (B) make good sense. 
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Furthermore, both of them sound plausible. 
3.7 Further implications of production causation for the exclusion argument 
Let us sum up our discussion so far. In the first part, I introduced Kim's argument on 
the explanatory exclusion principle, and explained how, together with explanatory 
realism, it supports a weaker causal exclusion principle as follows: 
(EEP) No event can have more than one sufficient and independent cause at t, 
unless it is a standard case of overdetermination. 
EEP is not enough to formulate an exclusion argument against non-reductive 
physicalism. What is needed is the following causal exclusion: 
(CEP) No event can have more than one sufficient cause at t, unless it is a 
standard case of overdetermination. 
We argued that in order to bridge the gap between EEP and CEP； one has to reject the 
possibility that an effect have two sufficient causes, while one of them is dependent on 
the other. We also argued that Kim's view on causation (together with a clarified 
notion of causal contribution) helps to deny that possibility. 
In the following, I want to argue that there are further significant implications for 
the formulation of the exclusion argument from Kim's view on causation and the 
understanding of causal contribution that I attributed to Kim. Namely, Kim's view on 
causation and that understanding of causal contribution, together with the causal 
closure principle, entails a very strong closure principle for the physical domain. With 
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that strong closure principle, the causal exclusion principle (CEP) becomes redundant 
to the formulation of the exclusion argument. Let us suppose that: 
m is any non-physical cause to the physical event p at t. 
This is because, as Kim mentioned: 
m causes p at t only if there is a causal contribution brought about by m at t. 
The causal contribution to a physical event, no doubt, must be a physical effect, which 
is thus a physical event, thus: 
m causes p at t only if there is a causal contribution brought about by m at t, which is a 
physical event. 
I clarified the notion of causal contribution as follows: 
A causal contribution of cause c to an effect is a specific causal effect e brought about 
by c through some spatial-temporal connection that satisfies spatial contiguity, such 
that c is solely responsible for the occurrence of e 
If so, 
m causes p at t only if there is a physical event e, which is solely brought about by m, 
which is a non-physical event. 
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Since m has to be solely responsible for the occurrence of e, it follows that no other 
physical cause can be responsible for e. Thus, 
m causes p at t only if there is a physical event e that does not have a sufficient physical 
cause at t. 
Thus, it is clear that if any non-physical event m causes p at t, then there is a physical 
effect that does not have a sufficient physical cause. This is a violation of the causal 
closure of the physical domain, which says that: 
If a physical event p has a cause at t, p has a sufficient physical cause at t. (Kim 2006: 
195) 
Thus, given Kim's conception of production causation and that view on causal 
contribution, together with the original causal closure of the physical domain, we get a 
much stronger causal closure principle of the physical domain, which says that: 
(Strong Closure) If a physical event has a cause at t, it does not have a non-physical 
cause at t; i.e., every one of the causes of a physical event must itself be a physical 
event. 
Given strong closure, the exclusion argument can go smoothly without any need to 
employ the causal exclusion principle. 
(1) m causes p at t. 
(2) Every one of the causes of a physical event must itself be a physical event. 
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Therefore, 
(3) m is a physical event. 
The conclusion of the above argument is clearly a denial of non-reductive physicalism. 
Indeed, in Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Kim does bring up a similar 
argument that adopts strong c l o s u r e，H e also admits that this is a "more direct way 
of ruling out overdetermination." According to Kim: 
Using this [strong closure] principle as a premise has two 
significant effects. First, it stops the overdetermination option in 
its track; Strong closure by itself disallows mental-physical 
causation. Second, Strong closure allows us to dispense with 
Exclusion. We no longer need this [causal exclusion] principle to 
exclude M in favor of P as P*'s cause, for the simple reason that 
Strong closure, in conjunction with Irreducibility, makes M 
ineligible as a cause of P*. (Kim 2005: 50) 
What Kim has not made explicit is whether strong closure is entailed in his view on 
causation and the weaker causal closure principle. 
If, so far, my understanding of Kim's view on causation and causal contribution is 
correct, Kim's view can effectively bridge the logical gap between EEP and CEP; i.e.: 
3° Kim's formulation of strong closure is as follows: 
Any cause of a physical event is itself a physical cause—that is, no nonphysical event can be a cause of 
a physical event. (Kim 2005: 50) 
While the wording is a bit different, Kim's formulation of strong closure is logically equivalent to mine. 
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(EEP) No event can have more than one sufficient and independent cause at t, 
unless it is a standard case of overdetermination. 
and 
(CEP) No event can have more than one sufficient cause at t, unless it is a 
standard case of overdetermination. 
Furthermore, the apparent difference between the original, weak causal closure of the 
physical domain and strong closure will also be totally insignificant. Thus, CEP will be 
redundant in the formulation of Kim's exclusion argument. 
If we have good reasons to accept Kim's conception of causation, CEP is no longer 
necessary to obtain the conclusion of the original exclusion argument; i.e., the 
exclusion argument without strong closure as a premise. Thus, CEP is only a superficial 
target for non-reductive physicalists to argue against. The genuine target should be 
Kim's production conception of causation. A non-reductive physicalist has to argue that 
in understanding mental causation, production is not the right conception of causation. 
Furthermore, a non-reductive physicalist should provide an account of causation that is 
consistent with the denial of strong closure and CEP, while preserving the four basic 
commitments, namely, the irreducibility of mental properties, the causal efficacy of 
mental properties, mind-body supervenience, and the (weak) causal closure of the 
physical domain. Also, in understanding mental causation, the sense of causation must 
be relevant. 
Indeed, many non-reductive physicalists do not accept the production conception 
of causation. Rather, they tend to accept counterfactual accounts of causation. In the 
51 
following chapter, we consider whether the dependence conception of causation is 
consistent with the denial of strong closure and CEP, while preserving the four basic 
commitments. Also we will discuss whether it is a more relevant concept of causation 
for understanding mental causation. 
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Chapter 4: Two concepts of causation and the 
supervenience/exclusion argument 
In the last chapter, I introduced Kim's argument for the causal exclusion principle, 
which says that: 
"If an event e has a sufficient cause c at t, no event at t distinct from c can be a cause of 
e, unless this is a genuine case of causal overdetermination." (Kim 2005: 17) 
Before I move on, I want to state the following points. 
1) Even though I argue that Kim's production conception of causation helps to motivate 
his argument for the causal exclusion principle, I did not mean that Kim's argument 
requires his specific production conception/account of causation. Rather, what is 
required is a conception of causation or any accounts of causation that can motivate 
the idea that a cause must have a specific causal contribution, as mentioned in the last 
chapter. I further add that Kim's view on causation can motivate that idea. 
If the idea that a cause must have a specific causal contribution is plausible, this 
would be troubling to a non-reductive physicalist. This is because, to a non-reductive 
physicalist, if a cause must have a specific causal contribution, any mental event that 
can be considered as being a cause of a physical event must have a specific causal 
contribution. If so, there must be a physical effect solely contributed by a non-physical 
event i.e., the mental event. If there is such a physical effect, the causal closure of the 
physical domain is violated. This implication is unacceptable to all physicalists. 
Indeed, the idea that a cause must have a specific causal contribution is not a 
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strange idea. Rather, it is an idea that we should be familiar with. In an elementary 
critical thinking course, students learn about the Mill's methods for identifying causes. 
Indeed, the method of residue suggests the very idea that a cause must have a specific 
causal contribution. We should not assert a new cause unless there is some residue. If 
we apply the method of residue in this case, we may argue that, presumably, all 
aspects of the physical effect are brought about by physical cause(s); thus； no aspect of 
the physical effect can be "subtracted out," which requires imposing a further mental 
cause to explain. 
Therefore, it seems to me that in order to make sense of the exclusion argument, 
one need not appeal to an idiosyncratic conception of causation. An ordinary 
conception is sufficient. 
2) The principle of explanatory exclusion is not enough to support the causal exclusion 
principle. To support the causal exclusion principle, a more specific view on causation is 
also required. 
Let us suppose that the following explanatory exclusion principle is correct: 
(EEP) No event can have more than one sufficient and independent cause at t, 
unless it is a standard case of overdetermination. 
If EEP is true, do non-reductive physicalists have some plausible ways of denying the 
causal exclusion principle, to avoid having to accept the soundness of the exclusion 
argument? Non-reductive physicalists claim that they do. To deny the idea that a cause 
must have a specific causal contribution (i.e., the idea that two different causes of the 
same effect must have their own, non-overlapping specific causal contributions), they 
must accept another view on causation to that of Kim's. Indeed, many of them accept 
different counterfactual analyses of causation. 
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One example is Barry Loewer, who has twice engaged in a debate with Kim, in a 
journal article and in a book on the philosophy of mind.^^ He explicitly pointed out that 
Kim's argument is motivated by his understanding of causation, namely, the idea that 
cause c causes an effect e only if c in some sense generates or produces e. However, 
Loewer thinks that the conception of causation is better understood in terms of 
counterfactual dependence. Furthermore, by understanding causation in terms of 
counterfactual dependence, non-reductive physicalists can have a defensible solution 
to the exclusion problem and non-reductive physicalism is provided with an account of 
"mental causation, or something near enough." 
In the following, I will introduce the dependence conception of causation (i.e., 
causation understood in terms of counterfactual dependence). Afterwards, I will 
explain how non-reductive physicalists can reject the causal exclusion principle by 
appealing to the dependence conception of causation. Later, I would discuss the 
debate between Barry Loewer and Kim. I will argue that Loewer's attempt to solve the 
exclusion problem for non-reductive physicalism has not been successful. 
4.1 The counterfactual analyses of causation—a general overview 
Ned Hall, who argues that there are fundamentally two concepts of causation, i.e. 
dependence and production, has characterized the dependence conception of 
causation as follows: 
. . ."dependence," is simply that: counterfactual dependence 
between wholly distinct events. In this sense, event c is a cause of 
(distinct) event e just in case e depends on c, that is, just in case, 
31 See Loewer (2002), Kim (2002b), and Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (2007). Besides Barry 
Loewer, Terry Horgan and Lynne Rudder Baker are two other examples. 
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had c not occurred, e would not have occurred. (Hall 2004: 225) 
Hall's dependence conception of causation^^ is the simplest counterfactual analysis of 
causation. Indeed, there are different counterfactual analyses of causation. An early 
one was proposed in David Lewis' seminal paper, Causation. In that paper, he further 
developed the counterfactual theory of causation. Given that c and e are actual and 
distinct events, instead of taking "had c not occurred, e would not have occurred" as 
the necessary and sufficient condition of c causes e, Lewis took it as the definition of 
causal dependence of e on c. Lewis' theory of causation is as follows: 
Let c, d, e,... be a finite sequence of actual particular events such 
that d depends causally on c, e on d, and so on throughout. Then 
this sequence is a causal chain. Finally, one event is a cause of 
another if there exists a causal chain leading from the first to the 
second. This completes my counterfactual analysis of causation. 
(Lewis 1993: 187) 
Some notes on Lewis' theory. (1) Given Lewis' analysis, the truth of the counterfactual 
"had c not occurred, e would not have occurred" is a sufficient condition, but not the 
necessary condition for c to be a cause of e. (2) Not all types of counterfactuals are 
allowed for assessing causal dependence. In most, if not all； of the cases, only 
non-backtracking counterfactuals are allowed for grounding or evaluating causal claims. 
In a non-back-tracking counterfactual, the event cited in the consequence of the 
counterfactual should not be an event that happened (temporally) before the event 
32 One may notice that I sometimes use the term "the dependence conception of causation" more 
broadly than Hall. 
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cited in the antecedence. Lewis argued that the past does not counterfactually depend 
on the present, nor does the future depend on the present (see Lewis 1979). 
There are many extremely sophisticated discussions on how the counterfactual 
account can (or cannot) avoid several well-known counter-examples, like different 
kinds of preemptions. In the process, different counterfactual theories of causation 
have emerged. Indeed, Lewis presented a different counterfactual theory in 2000. 
Lewis' view in 2000 has also been endorsed by Barry Loewer. Lewis' 2000 theory is as 
follows: 
C causes E if C and E occur and there is a chain of events 
connected by influence from C to E. (Loewer 2007: 255) 
What is meant by "a chain of events connected by influence from C to E"? The 
following is the explanation from Lewis: 
C influences E if there is a substantial range Cl； C2 ... of different 
not-too-distant alterations of C (including the actual alteration of 
C) and there is a range of E l , E2 ... of alteration of E, at least some 
of which differ, such that if C l had occurred, E l would have 
occurred, and if C2 had occurred, E2 would have occurred and so 
on. (Lewis 2000: 190) 
Suppose I put something on the electronic weighing-scales. If that thing was 60 kg, the 
weighing scales would indicate that it was 60 kg. If I put something else on it that was 
only 30 kg, the weighing-scales would indicate that it was 30 kg. According to this 
account, the weight of the thing that I put on the weighing-scales caused the result. 
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We need not go into the details of these complicated discussions or discuss 
whether any counterfactual theories of causation are defensible. We only need to spell 
out the basic idea of the dependence conception, and see how, according to 
non-reductive physicalists, it helps to save non-reductive physicalism if it works. Our 
focus is simple—it is to determine whether the dependence conception, if viable, can 
save non-reductive physicalism. In the following, unless stated otherwise, the 
dependence conception of causation should be understood as follows: 
Dependence: Counterfactual dependence between wholly distinct events is sufficient 
for causation. (Hall 2004: 225) 
The counterfactual theory reduces causation to counterfactual dependence. According 
to the (simplest) counterfactual theory, given that c and e are two actual and distinct 
events, if the counterfactual "if c had not occurred, then e would not have occurred" is 
true, then c is a cause of e ” 
What is the condition for the counterfactual "if c had not occurred, then e would 
not have occurred" to be true? The Stalnaker-Lewis possible world semantics is usually 
applied when we have to evaluate the truth of a counterfactual. The basic idea is that 
we may decide whether a counterfactual is true by comparing different possible worlds; 
some of these worlds are more similar, or closer, to the actual world than others; while 
some are less similar, or farther away. The counterfactual "if c had not occurred, then e 
would not have occurred" is true if and only if all of the non-c worlds (a non-c world is a 
possible world in which event c has not happened) that are closest to the actual world 
are non-e worlds. 
What makes one possible world closer, or more similar, to the actual world than 
See Lewis (1993: 187). 
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another possible world? Certainly, it depends on the content of the two possible 
worlds and what is true in the actual world. Two factors determining closeness are (1) 
the similarity of (natural) laws and (2) the particular facts. 
According to Lewis, laws are "weighty； but not sacred" (Lewis 1993: 184). A 
possible world in which no actual laws are violated may not necessarily be one of the 
closest possible worlds to the actual world. For example, suppose determinism is true 
in the actual world. If so, w l , a possible world having the same set of laws as the actual 
world in which no actual laws are violated, should also be deterministic. As w l is not 
the same as the actual world, w l must be different from the actual world, with the only 
possible difference being a difference in particular fact F that happens at, let us say, 
time t. Given determination, either F or not F is the case; it must be causally 
determined by preceding facts. If so, the difference in the particular fact F entails a 
difference in preceding conditions at t-1, and t-2, and t-3 and so on. In other words, it 
entails differences between the actual world and w l in every moment of time on and 
before t, and the differences can be drastic! Since it is strange to say that w l , which has 
a drastically different history with the actual world, is the closest possible world, the 
closest possible worlds can be worlds with miracles. This shows that particular facts 
also have significant weight in determining the truth of a counterfactual. Both laws and 
particular facts can be weighty, depending on their nature and the extent (Lewis 1993: 
184) of their similarity and dissimilarity. 
Indeed, the evaluation of the truth value of counterfactuals is always context 
dependent, and somewhat vague. David Lewis admitted as much when he said that the 
"vagueness of overall similarity will not be entirely resolved" (Lewis 1993: 184). 
Nevertheless, the basic idea of evaluation is clear enough. 
4.2 How the dependence conception of causation helps non-reductive 
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physicalists to avoid the causal exclusion principle 
Non-reductive physicalists believe that mental properties are supervenient on physical 
properties. Thus, if mental event m causes physical event p*at t, m should have a 
relevant supervenience base p. p, presumably, should also be a cause of p* at t. 
Therefore, a case of mental-physical causation is a case that fits one possibility 
mentioned by Kim in his argument for the explanatory exclusion principle, namely: 
c l is distinct from c2, but in some clear sense reducible to, or supervenient on c2. Since 
c l is dependent on c2, we do not have two independent and complete explanations; 
rather, c l is in a clear sense dependent on c2 and, thus, C l is dependent on C2. 
m is distinct, but supervenient on p (since m is irreducible to p). I argued in the last 
chapter that given Kim's view of causation, only p will be the cause of p* and m will be 
excluded as a cause. Kim's reason should be similar, if not identical, to the following: 
(A) If c is a cause of e at t, then c makes a distinct causal contribution (or it plays a 
distinct causal role) in causing e at t. 
(B) If c is dependent on c* (in the sense of supervenience and reduction), and c* is a 
sufficient cause of e at t, then c cannot make any distinct causal contribution in causing 
e att . 
Thus, if c is dependent on c* (in the sense of supervenience and reduction), and c* is a 
sufficient cause of e at t, then c is not a cause of e at t. 
Given the dependence conception of causation, a non-reductive physicalist does 
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not need to accept (A). This is because, given the dependence conception, whether m 
is a cause of p* is not a matter of whether m has a distinct causal role or specific causal 
contribution. Rather, it is a matter of whether the relevant counterfactuals are true.^ "^ 
Take the simplest dependence conception as an example: given that m, p, and p* are 
all actual events, as long as both "had m not occurred, p* would not have occurred" 
and "had p not occurred, p* would not have occurred" are also true, both m and p can 
be counted as causes of p*. Whether m or p has any specific contributions or roles is 
not relevant. Thus, with a dependence conception in hand, a non-reductive physicalist 
need not accept (A). 
What a non-reductive physicalist needs, however, is a relevant set of laws for 
grounding the relevant counterfactuals, regardless of whether these laws are strict 
laws or ceteris paribus laws. That is why Loewer said, "[Non-reductive physicalism] is 
committed to the existence of mental laws" (Loewer 2007: 249). 
I should be noted that the dependence conception of causation is compatible 
with explanatory realism; i.e., the truth of the explanatory proposition "M (causally) 
explains P*" should be grounded by some objective facts, m and p* should also satisfy 
a certain objective relation R. If we accept the dependence conception of causation, we 
must accept that m and p are two distinct causes of p*; hence, M and P are two distinct, 
but dependent explanations of P*. So far, the dependence conception of causation also 
seems to be compatible with the explanatory exclusion principle: 
No event can be given more than one complete and independent causal explanation, 
unless it is a standard case of overdetermination. 
34 How many, and which, counterfactuals are relevant depends on which version of the counterfactual 
theory of causation is in play. 
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If so, even if one finds Kim's explanatory realism and explanatory exclusion principle to 
be plausible, one might still reject the causal exclusion principle by affirming the 
dependence conception of causation if the counterfactual analysis of causation is 
correct. 
4.3 Production conception vs. dependence conception? The debate between 
Kim and Loewer (I) 
So far, it seems that non-reductive physicalists have an appealing alternative to the 
production conception of causation. With the dependence conception in hand, one 
need not accept the causal exclusion principle. Can we simply close the file on the 
exclusion problem in the following simple way? Whether the superveniece/exclusion 
argument works depends on which conception of causation we choose. If we choose 
production conception, then Kim is right, and non-reductive physicalism is 
incompatible with mental-physical causation and mental-mental causation. If we 
choose the dependence conception, then non-reductive physicalism is compatible with 
the two types of mental causation.^^ Why don't we just stop here? 
We should not stop here because, first of all, it might be the case that there is only 
one single correct conception of causation. If so, while other conceptions exist, at least 
one of them could be wrong in some way. Being consistent with the explanatory 
exclusion principle in no way means that a theory is a true theory of causation, or that 
it is a proper conception. Can it not be the case that at least one of the theories is too 
idiosyncratic in comparison with our ordinary conception of causation? 
Even if we endorse Ned Hall's view that there really are two fundamentally 
different conceptions of causation, such that the production conception and the 
35 John Searle seems to be taking a view similar to what I have said. See Searle (1998: 57-62). 
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dependence conception need not compete to be the correct conception of causation, 
some problems still remain. The following questions are still legitimate questions. 
Given that physicalism is the background of the issue, which conception of causation is 
in play in science, especially physics? Which conception of causation is in play when we 
are talking about agency and mental-physical causation? Is it somehow problematic to 
understand agency in terms of dependence? 
These questions are the central questions in the debate between Kim and Loewer. 
Loewer argues that there is no production causation in physics, and that it is good 
enough to understand agency in terms of the dependence conception (more accurately, 
in terms of Lewis' 2000 theory). However, Kim thought that there is production 
causation in physics and that production conception is crucial for understanding agency. 
We turn to Loewer's objections to Kim first. 
4.3.1 Loewer's objections to the use of production conception in the 
formulation of the supervenience/exclusion argument 
Loewer argues against the use of production conception in the formulation of the 
supervenience/exclusion argument for two reasons. (1) The production conception is 
plainly untenable since there is no production in the world. He says, "The trouble is 
that there is no relation of causal production quite like this" (Loewer 2007: 253). (2) 
Even though production is not untenable, Kim does not have a concept of production in 
hand that is good enough for formulating the supervenience/exclusion argument into a 
forceful argument against non-reductive physicalism. 
4.3.2 The first reason put forward by Loewer 
How does Loewer argue for his reason (1)? As I see it, he never formulates clear 
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arguments for that. However, from his wordings, I think I can formulate his points into 
two arguments. He says that, on the one hand, "... Russell noted ... that the notion of 
causation makes no appearance in the fundamental dynamical laws of physics ... 
Russell concluded, correctly in my view, that causation ... is not among the fundamental 
furniture of the universe" (Loewer 2007: 253); on the other hand, the "production 
conception of causation seems to involve facts that fail to supervene on the 
fundamental laws and facts" (Loewer 2002: 661). I think that Loewer's points can be 
formulated into two arguments as follows. 
Here is the first one: 
P I ) If there are no cases of causation in the sense of production at the fundamental 
level, then there are no cases of causation in the sense of production. 
P2) There are no cases of causation in the sense of production at the fundamental 
level. 
C) There are no cases of causation in the sense of production. 
And the second one: 
P3) If there are cases of causation in the sense of production, then there are some facts 
that are not supervenient on the fundamental physical facts. 
P4) All facts are supervenient on the fundamental physical facts. 
C) There are no cases of causation in the sense of production. 
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Both arguments point to the same conclusion, as he said, "the trouble is that there is 
no relation of causation production that works quite like this" (Loewer 2007: 253). Let 
us start with the first argument. 
As I see it, he did not argue for P I . Concerning P2, he appealed to Bertrand 
Russell, claiming that causation (in the sense of production) "makes no appearance in 
the fundamental dynamical laws of physics" (Loewer 2007: 253). His point, as I 
understand it, is that laws in fundamental physics are only equations and those 
equations fully describe the fundamental level. However, in those equations, we only 
see how different possible physical states are (counterfactually) related, but not 
anyone producing others. Thus, there is no production at the fundamental level. 
However, no matter well-grounded P2 is严 the first argument does not appear to be 
convincing, since P I is not argued for, and it appears to have no support. Kim is quite 
right to cast doubt on PI . On the one hand, he argues that the uses of concepts like 
"force" and "energy flow" have provided numerous instances of causation in the sense 
of production, and that these seem to be good cases of production. For example, the 
energy flowing from neural circuits brings about contractions of the muscles in my 
arm.37 Thus, it seems that there is production in physics, even though the concept of 
production may not be mentioned in fundamental physics. On the other hand, Kim 
pointed out that the antecedent of P I does not seem to entail the consequence of it, as 
he said: 
36 Indeed, P2 is also dubious to some philosophers. Alyssa Ney pointed out in one presentation that 
while "causality" is always mentioned in Physical Review journals, it does not seem to be the case that 
causality is never mentioned in discussions on fundamental physics. Also, she pointed out that what 
those engaged in fundamental physics are doing is (partly) providing accounts for different types of 
causation interactions, and explaining the failure of the causal relation in terms of non-locality. If she is 
right, then production conception does have a role to play in fundamental physics. Kim also has doubts 
about P2, as he sees that the debate on quantum mechanics is full of causal talk; for details, see 
Kim(2002b: 76). I am not in a good position to make judgments on this issue, due to my lack of relevant 
knowledge. For this reason, I only put down an alternative view on P2 here. Indeed, my rejection of 
Loewer does not depend on the truth/falsity of P2. 
37 See Kim (2009: 44-45). 
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...the mere fact that a generative concept of causation is not 
present at the fundamental micro-physical level does not mean 
that it cannot appear at higher levels. (Kim 2009: 44) 
Kim does not make a strong claim that the entailment must fail. However, given that it 
is far from clear that the consequence follows from the antecedence, and the fact that 
the description of physical processes as energy flows, force, and momentum transfers 
is perfectly proper in discourse on physics, unless we have a good reason not to take 
those descriptions as accurate descriptions of facts, we have a better reason to deny P I 
then to accept it at this stage. 
The second argument does not seem to be any better than the first. P4 is a basic 
commitment of all physicalists. I think we might grant it here. What about P3? Once 
again, we do not see any arguments about this from Loewer. Even though there is 
really no production at the fundamental level, the possibility that production emerges 
from the fundamental level has not yet been denied. If cases of production really do 
emerge from the fundamental fact, just why production would be something not 
supervenient on the fundamental physical facts is u n c l e a r ” 
Furthermore, even if the two arguments are convincing, the conclusion, rather 
than supporting non-reductive physicalism, might be devastating to it. Now suppose 
we grant that (C) is correct: 
C) There are no cases of causation in the sense of production. 
Furthermore, it seems possible to conduct a reductive analysis on the production conception of 
causation. Such an analysis was provided by Ned Hall (2004). If Hall's analysis, or the "conserved quantity 
approach to causation" proposed by Phil Dowe and Wesley Salmon, or some other similar theory, is the 
correct account of production causation, then the argument that if there is production in the world, 
there must be some facts that fail to be supervenient on the physical facts, would not seem to hold. 
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We might consider what follows if the following is also correct: 
(P5) If mental causation is real, then there are cases of causation in the sense of 
production. 
What follows is that mental-causation is unreal!^^ Indeed, Kim does have some reason 
to support P5. He said: 
...we care about mental causation, it seems to me, chiefly 
because we care about human agency, and evidently agency 
involves a production/generative notion of causation. An Agent is 
someone who brings about a state of affairs for reasons. If there 
indeed are no productive causal relation in the world, that would 
effectively take away agency—and our worries about mental 
causation along with it. (Kim 2009: 44) 
Here Kim does not need to argue that all cases of mental causation involve production. 
But if Kim was correct in pointing out that agency involves production (and I think that 
this is the case with regard to many cases of agency), then at least many cases of 
mental causation are unreal if both (C) and P5 are correct. For a non-reductive 
physicalist, that is troubling enough. 
To conclude, it does not seem that Loewer has successfully argued that there are 
no cases of production. Worse still, if his arguments had been convincing, they might 
have provided no support for non-reductive physicalism; rather, they might have been 
Kim noticed this too. See Kim (2002b: 675). 
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counterproductive to a non-reductive physicalist. 
4.3.3 Loewer's argument for (2) 
What about his argument for ⑵？ That argument only appears in his very recent debate 
with Kim. Loewer said: 
If we understand 'production' literally as the producer being 
sufficient for its product, then for an event E occurring at time t 
only a vast part if the physical situation at t-1 can be said to 
'produce' E. A consequence is that relatively local macroscopic 
events that occur a second apart are not literally related by 
production. If production is understood less literally then we 
might be able to characterize a relation of production that relates 
relatively local macroscopic events, but this relation does not 
support the denial of overdetermination required by the exclusion 
argument. (Loewer 2007: 253) 
Another statement after his discussion on his argument is as follows: 
The upshot of this discussion is that if production is understood 
literally then perhaps Exclusion holds, but neither brain events 
nor mental events are producers of bodily movements. But if 
production in understood as local production it is compatible with 
an event having multiple producers. (Loewer 2007: 255) 
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Loewer's intention to formulate a dilemma is clear. What exactly is his argument? Here 
we try to formulate his argument step by step. 
Based on what he says, the following argument should be part of his view: 
P6) If production is understood literally, any event that sufficiently produces the effect 
is not a local event. 
P7) m and p are local events. 
C2) Neither m nor p sufficiently produce e. 
Loewer thinks that P6 is a piece of common sense among philosophers of science. He 
said: 
It is a commonplace among philosophers of science, but perhaps 
not as recognized as it should be outside of philosophy of science, 
that for any small region R of space at time t nothing much short 
of the state of the universe in a sphere with center R and whose 
radius is one light second (i.e. 186000 miles) at t-1 second is 
causally sufficient for determining what will occur (or the chances 
at t-1 of what will occur) in R. (Loewer 2007: 252) 
We may take Loewer's report on what philosophers of science think for granted at this 
moment, and thus we may grant that P6 is true. P7 seems to be giving Loewer a reason 
to develop the first horn of his dilemma. 
L I ) if production is understood literally (such that any events that sufficiently produce 
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the effect are not local events), then m and p do not sufficiently produce the effect e. 
Another horn of the dilemma takes production less literally. Loewer asks us to consider 
the following case: a ball C moves forward at t-1, and then C strikes B to move at t. In 
this case, it seems quite clear that we may consider C's movement to be the producer 
of B's movement, even though C's movement does not, literally, sufficiently produce 
B's. Loewer further points out that there are plenty of producers that produce B's 
movement at t if we understand production in this way. He said: 
. . .of course the two balls do not really constitute an isolated 
system, and a great deal more than the motion of ball C goes into 
producing the motion of ball B. (Loewer 2007: 254) 
Thus, Loewer accepts the following, which is the second horn: 
L2) if production is understood less literally, then it is possible for e to have more than 
one local producer. 
Now we have two horns in hand. What follows from them? I think that what Barry 
Loewer has in mind is that, when Kim formulated the supervenience/exclusion 
argument by the production conception, he must either understand production literally, 
or less literally. If Kim understood production literally, then m and p, which are both 
purported to be causes that are sufficient to produce e, cannot qualify as causes. Since 
they should both be local events； local events cannot be sufficient causes in this sense. 
If Kim understood production less literally, then m and p need not be competing 
producers, since given this less literal understanding, e can have multiple producers. If 
70 
so, having two producers, i.e. m and p, does not seem to be problematic. At least there 
is no exclusion between the two producers. 
If my understanding on Loewer is correct, Loewer's objection to Kim rests on two 
problematic assumptions: 
(a) Both m and p are local events. 
(b) Either m and p are both producers in the literal sense (I think it would be clearer to 
use the term "sufficient producers"), or m and p are both producers in the non-literal 
sense (I prefer to use the term "non-sufficient producers"). 
Both (a) and (b) can be denied, and I would argue that given the denial of (a) and (b), 
Barry Loewer's objection does no damage at all to Kim's exclusion argument. 
First, I would have to point out that, in the supervenience/exclusion argument, p 
results from the causal closure of the physical domain; thus, p must be a sufficient 
physical producer of e. If a sufficient producer cannot be a local event, we have a good 
reason to take p as a non-local event, or a combination of numerous physical events. I 
see no reason for Kim to deny this. 
But why does Kim have to accept that m is also a sufficient producer? Indeed, he 
does not need to accept that. In formulating that supervenience/exclusion argument, 
Kim never needs to take m as a sufficient producer of e. What the 
supervenience/exclusion argument rejects is not only the view that m is a sufficient 
cause of e, but also the possibility that m is a partial cause. The 
supervenience/exclusion argument attempts to show that mental causes can have no 
causal role if they are not reduced to physical causes. A more explicit formulation of 
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the exclusion argument by understanding a cause as a producer of the effect will help 
to make things clear: 
W l ) m (either as a sufficient producer or not) helps to produce e； at t. (For reductio.) 
W2) p sufficiently produces e at t. (Given W l and the causal closure of the physical 
domain.) 
W3) p sufficiently produces e at t, and m helps to produce e at t. ( W l and W2) 
W4) If an event p sufficiently produces e at t, no event at t distinct from c can help to 
produce e, unless this is a genuine case of causal overdetermination. (Causal 
exclusion principle) 
W5) W3 is not the case. (Given W4.) (Hence, either W l or W2 is false.) 
W6) W l is false, i.e., m does not help to produce e at t. (Due to physical causal closure.) 
Those who are familiar with Kim's argument would certainly see that I have added 
nothing new to Kim's argument. I have only made more explicit the point that p is a 
sufficient producer, but m is not, and that p is not a local producer. Also, a word like 
"producer" is not ambiguous in my statement; it only means production in the less 
literal sense, unless I add the word "sufficient" before it. If anyone wants to argue that 
Kim does not have a useful production conception in hand for formulating the 
supervenience argument, one needs to find another argument. 
Furthermore, we may reconsider the second horn of Loewer's argument. Even if I 
accept that both m and p are local events and I understand production less literally, we 
still do not get the conclusion that a non-reductive physicalist would count both m and 
p as causes of e. Since m, according to non-reductive physicalism, is a non-physical 
event, if both m and p are producers of e, m must have a specific causal contribution to 
the occurrence of e, such that there must be a physical effect without sufficient 
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physical cause (since it is caused by m). This is clearly a violation of the causal closure of 
the physical domain. Due to the causal closure of the physical domain, a non-reductive 
physicalist could never consider m to be a producer of e. m must be excluded by some 
other physical cause(s), if not by p. 
Here I conclude that Loewer fails to argue for (2). Loewer fails to show that it is 
problematic to formulate the supervenience/exclusion argument in terms of the 
production concept ion， 
What about the dependence conception? Is it problematic to understand mental 
causation in terms of the dependence conception? 
4.4 Production conception vs. dependence conception? The debate between 
Kim and Loewer (II) 
Kim thinks that it is problematic to understand mental causation in terms of 
dependence causation. Overall, Kim's reasons are threefold: 1) The dependence 
conception does not distinguish epiphenomena from a genuine causal process. 2) Since 
agency is a major concern for people who are concerned about mental causation, and 
agency must involve causation in terms of production, the dependence conception is 
simply irrelevant to the issue. 3) The test of counterfactual dependence is a poor test of 
causation. A related objection is that the counterfactual test counts too much: while it 
counts some cases of omissions, which sounds unproblematic, it also counts many 
4° There is more point concerning Loewer's argument for (2). It seems that, to Loewer, the main 
question concerning the truth of the causal exclusion principle is whether two distinct events occupying 
the same spatio-temporal region can both be causes of another event (Loewer 2007: 252). I think that 
this is not the main question. If my view on the exclusion argument is correct so far, the main questions 
are, rather: (1) whether it is necessary to attribute a causal contribution to m in order to count m as a 
cause of e, and (2) if it is necessary, whether it is still possible to attribute a specific causal contribution 
to m, such that m can be counted as a cause, if e is sufficiently caused by p and the physical domain is 
causally closed. The spatial-temporal location of m and p does not seem to be relevant to the issue. 
Besides, while Loewer seems to be wrong from the very beginning, I think this fault is not relevant to the 
soundness of his argument for (2), and that is why I have only mentioned this point in a footnote. 
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cases that are clearly absurd. 
In the following, I will assess Kim's objections one by one. 
4.4.1 Can a non-reductive physicalist distinguish epiphenomena from a 
genuine causal process by the dependence conception of causation? 
As mentioned, Kim thinks that non-reductive physicalists cannot distinguish 
epiphenomena from a genuine causal process in terms of the dependence conception. 
Why not? Take one case of mental-physical causation: 
Peter is having a headache, so he takes some Aspirin. 
As mentioned above, according to the counterfactual analysis, the above causal 
relation holds if the following counterfactual is true: 
(C I ) If Peter had not been having a headache, he would not have taken Aspirin. 
What can ground the truth of the above counterfactual? We certainly need the 
relevant law (either a strict law or a ceteris paribus law). Perhaps a law like the 
following: 
(C2) "Ceteris paribus, whenever Peter is having a headache, he will take some Aspirin." 
We may need a more general law, but this does not matter to our discussion. What 
matters, according to Kim, is that this law can also be endorsed by an 
epiphenomenalist. It sounds coherent to say that Peter's headache is somehow 
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produced by the underlying physical event, and the genuine cause of Peter's (bodily 
movement of) taking the Aspirin is the underlying physical event. Furthermore, an 
epiphenomenalist can certainly agree that the underlying physical event and the bodily 
movement exhibit a law-like regularity, as do the underlying physical event and the 
headache. If so, it seems that an epiphenomenalist can accept the same set of 
regularities as a non-reductive physicalist; however, an epiphenomenalist would deny 
that Peter's headache is the cause of his taking the Aspirin. If so, there is no reason to 
think that (C2) is a regularity that sufficiently grounds a genuine causal relation. Also, 
we do not seem to have a good reason to think that (CI) , which is grounded by (C2) is a 
genuine causal relation. Certainly, according to epiphenomenalism, the relation 
between the underlying physical event and Peter's headache should be a causal 
relation. However, that relation, according to a non-reductive physicalist, should be 
supervenience or realization. Kim believes that the difference is insignificant. According 
to him: 
The situation is fundamentally the same if you believe that the 
dependence relation between mental states and their neural 
substrates is better described in terms of supervenience or 
realization than causation. (Kim 2007: 234) 
If Kim is right, then if C I and C2 are the only grounds for non-reductive physicalism to 
affirm mental-physical causation, the non-reductive physicalist's ground is not 
sufficient. 
Barry Loewer disagrees with Kim. Loewer thinks that the grounds for 




P I > P2 
Let us say that Peter's headache is M l , the underlying physical event is P I , and (the 
bodily movement of) Peter's taking Aspirin is P2. Loewer thinks that an 
epiphenomenalist cannot affirm the following counterfactual: 
(C l ) If M l had not occurred, P2 would not have occurred."^^ 
Non-reductive physicalists, however, have no problem in affirming (Cl) ; thus, Kim fails 
to show that C l is an insufficient ground for mental-physical causation. 
Why does Loewer think that an epiphenomenalist cannot affirm C l , but that 
non-reductive physicalist can? According to Loewer: 
...if we evaluate counterfactuals along Lewisian lines, -Ml>-P2 fails 
since the most similar world in which the horizontal law connecting 
P I to P2 continues to hold. On the other hand, -P l>-P2 may be true. 
In contrast to this [non-reductive physicalism] holds that the 
connection between P I and M l is one of metaphysical not mere 
nomological necessitation ... So - M l > - P 2 may well be true. But it 
would be question begging to say that M l isn't really a cause of P2 
in this case, say because it doesn't produce or transfer causal liquid 
to P2. (Loewer 2007: 257-258) 
This has the same meaning as C l above. 
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Why, given epiphenomenalism, is the closest n o n - M l world a world in which P2 occurs? 
Given the Lewis-Stalnaker possible semantics, the closest non-Ml world should be a 
world in which P I occurs and the nomological relation between P I and M l breaks 
down. In this world, since the regularity between P I and P2 should still hold, P2 should 
still occur. Thus, given epiphenomenalism, the closest n o n - M l world should be a world 
in which P2 occurs; hence, P2 is not causally dependent on M l . 
Should the closest non-Ml world be a non-P2 world if non-reductive physicalism 
is true? The closest non-Ml world is also a non-P2 world. Since, according to Loewer, 
P I metaphysically necessitates M l , a non-Ml world should also be a non-Pl world. 
Thus, in that n o n - M l world, P I is not there to necessitate P2. Therefore, C I may well 
be true. 
Certainly, it is up to Loewer to accept a stronger supervenience, such that P I 
metaphysically necessitates M l . I think that a non-reductive physicalist need not affirm 
such a strong supervenience thesis. There is another way out. Non-reductive 
physicalists (who accept functionalism) believe that M l is realized by P I and that P I 
realizes M l in virtue of its satisfying a certainly causal role. Thus, it is quite reasonable 
for a non-reductive physicalist to affirm that P I realizes M l in virtue of its causing P2. 
The most natural reason for P i ' s failure to realize M l should be its failure to cause P2. 
Thus, a non-reductive physicalist can affirm that the closest non-Ml world is a world in 
which P I fails to cause P2, such that it is also a non-P2 world. Either way, we get the 
conclusion that given non-reductive physicalism, C I should be true. 
Thus； it seems that if a non-reductive physicalist accepts the dependence 
conception of causation, he can consistently distinguish between epiphenomenalism 
and non-reductive physicalism. It seems that Kim was correct in saying that both 
epiphenomenalists and non-reductive physicalists can affirm (CI ) only if the conception 
of causation in play is the production conception. If so, unless Kim provides a good 
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reason to show that the conception of causation in play should be the production 
conception； Kim's argument that (C I ) does not provide sufficient ground for 
mental-physical causation fails. 
4.4.2 Does agency require production? 
Has Kim provided any reason to show that the relevant conception of causation in the 
mental causation debate should be production conception? He has in fact attempted to 
provide such a reason. Kim thinks that the dependence conception is not a relevant 
conception for understanding mental causation, because "agency requires productive 
causation" (Kim 2007: 236). This is Kim's second objection to the counterfactual 
solution. He said: 
...relation of causation as dependence, or counterfactual 
dependence, even if it is a proper and useful causal relation, is not 
the source of our worries about mental causation ... 
Fundamentally these worries arise, I believe, from the question 
whether mentality has the power to bring about its effects in a 
continuous process of generation and production. (Kim 2007: 
236). 
Why is that? Kim's answer is that it is because our worries about mental causation 
come from our concern about human agency, and human agency "requires the 
productive/generative conception of causation" (Kim 2007: 236). What exactly does 
Kim consider to be an agent? He said: 
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An agent is someone who, on account of her beliefs, desires, 
emotions, intentions and the like, has the capacity to perform 
actions in the physical world: that is, to cause her limbs and other 
bodily parts (e.g. the vocal cords) to move in an appropriate way 
as to bring about changes in the arrangement of objects and 
events around her open a door, pick up the morning paper, and 
make a cup of coffee. (Kim 2007: 236) 
Clearly, what Kim has in mind with regard to someone exhibiting his/her agency is that 
a person generates a certain transfer of energy that leads to an intentional action in 
virtue of the person's beliefs, desires, and the like. Causation understood merely in 
terms of counterfactual dependence seems to fail to capture the causal process in 
cases of agency. 
To respond to Kim's point on behalf of the non-reductive physicalists, it is not 
enough to simply state that several actions are counterfactually dependent on the 
preceding mental states, or that there are influences (in Lewis' sense) between the 
mental states and the bodily movements. It is also insufficient to point out how those 
relevant counterfactuals or influences are crucial to our understanding of agency. 
4.4.3 Kim's third objection on omissions 
Kim has a third reason to argue against the counterfactual solution. He thinks that if we 
understand agency only in terms of dependence, this understanding of mental 
causation must be too broad. It will count too many cases of "mental causation" which 
do not seem to be "causation worth having" (Kim 2007: 238). This leads to Kim's third 
objection to the counterfactual solution. 
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Some people who accept the dependence conception of causation would point 
out that the dependence conception helps to account for causal relations involving 
omissions; i.e., omissions can be caused on the one hand, and they can be causes on 
the other. What is meant by omission is the non-occurrence of certain events. Consider 
the following example. Suppose the quality of Peter's television is very bad. It easily 
becomes overheated. One day, Peter forgot to switch off the television before going 
out. This led to a fire. It seems that the following counterfactual should be true: 
If Peter had switched off the television, the fire would not have occurred. 
To many people, especially to those who agree that omissions can be causes, it would 
seem that Peter's not switching off the television should be a cause of the fire. People 
who endorse the counterfactual analysis may welcome this result. Clearly, the 
omission—Peter's not switching off the television—did not generate the fire through 
any such process as energy flow or momentum transfer. Thus, this could be a case of 
causation without production. If so, can it not be that there are cases of mental 
causation that involve omissions as causes, such that there are cases of mental 
causation that can only be accounted for by dependence conception? If so, 
dependence conception would seem to have an advantage over production conception, 
since some cases of mental causation have to be understood in terms of dependence 
conception. 
Kim seems to admit that sometimes we do count omissions as caLises,^ However, he 
does not think that this fact gives the dependence conception a clear advantage. 
Rather, he thinks that if omissions can be counted as causes by the dependence 
42 He has said that we sometimes count omissions as actions. (Kim 2007: 237) 
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conception, too many such causes would be counted. Let us again consider the case of 
Peter's television. As mentioned, the following counterfactual seems to be true: 
If Peter had switched off the television, the fire would not have occurred. 
If omissions should be counted as causes, Peter's not switching off the television 
should be counted as cause. It seems that the following counterfactuals are also true: 
If Mary had switched off the television, the fire would not have occurred. 
If Johnny had switched off the television, the fire would not have occurred. 
If Obama had switched off the television, the fire would not have occurred. 
Therefore, many similar counterfactuals are also true. If so, many omissions should also 
be counted as causes as well. This would be absurd. 
What about cases of mental-physical causation? Cases of the lack of certain mental 
properties are all mental omissions. If omissions can be causes (and effects), while 1 am 
sitting here typing this thesis, many cases of mental-physical causation are happening 
at the same time. For example: 
My lack of intention to drink a cup of coffee causes me to not go out and brew a cup of 
coffee. 
My lack of hunger causes me to not go out and eat some noodles. 
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My not feeling tired causes me to not go to bed at this moment. 
Kim's main point, once again, is that, if omissions can be counted as causes by the 
dependence conception, the dependence conception would count too many such 
causes, and the result will be absurd. I think that is why Kim said, "If mental omissions 
count as mental causation, that would make mental causation easy—too easy". And 
mental causation involving mental omissions, at least in many cases, "doesn't look like 
a causation worth having" (Kim 2007: 238). 
4.4.4 Loewer's responses to Kim's second and third objections 
Let us consider Loewer's response to Kim's second and third objections. The following 
is the only passage from Loewer that sounds relevant to Kim's second and third 
objections: 
Kim's objection seems to be that since dependence can connect an 
omission (Mary's not watering the plants) with an event (the 
plant's dying) even though there is no transfer of energy from Mary 
to the plants, dependence cannot really be what we want by 
mental causation. He says of it "This is not causation worth 
h a v i n g . � … I n any case, omissions are not events. It doesn't follow 
from the fact that there is dependence on omissions that 
dependence on commissions, and specifically the counterfactual 
sensitivity of the positions of one's body (and fingers, and so on) to 
one's volitions and the counterfactual sensitivity of one's volitions 
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on one's intentions, beliefs (and so on), is "not causation worth 
having." Indeed, these relations of dependence and influence are 
absolutely essential to mentality and action. If the transfer of 
energy is involved in any case of genuine mental causation it is also 
likely involved in any case of mental causation as influence. But the 
mere transfer of energy certainly isn't what we want for mental 
causation. Exactly how (certainly not how much) energy is 
transferred is essential to our minds controlling our bodies (and 
other kinds of mental causation). (Loewer 2007: 258) 
Loewer seems to have missed Kim's points. A surprisingly significant part of his 
response is a red herring. Concerning Kim's second objection, Kim's point is that there 
is agency only if there is production. Kim does not say that agency only involves 
production; thus, whether "mere transfer of energy is what we want for mental 
causation" is not relevant to Kim's objection. In fact, Kim has made his point clear: 
We need not claim that dependency is not involved in action; it 
may well be that the dependency involved, say between a limb 
movement and a desire, has an explanation in terms of the 
productive/generative relations between them. (Kim 2007: 236) 
Since Kim can admit that dependency is involved in mental causation, Kim is also free 
to admit that "dependence on commissions, and specifically the counterfactual 
sensitivity of the positions of one's body (and fingers, and so on) to one's volitions and 
the counterfactual sensitivity of one's volitions on one's intentions, beliefs (and so on)" 
can be mental causation worth having. Kim only says that many cases of mental 
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causations involving mental omissions are not causation worth having. Concerning the 
third objection, Loewer does not deny that omissions can be causes (and effects). 
Furthermore, Loewer says nothing of how, if mental causation is only understood in 
terms of the dependence conception of causation, we can exclude those cases of 
omission as genuine mental causation. He has also not explained why we do not need 
to exclude them. Kim's third objection is totally untouched. 
Clearly, Loewer fails to provide good responses to Kim's second and third 
objections. 
4.4.5. Further discussion on Kim's second and third objections 
Loewer's failure to respond to the two objections does not show that there cannot be 
good responses. In the following, I want to further consider Kim's third and second 
objections. 
Kim's third objection can give us a positive reason to reject the counterfactual 
solution only if the counterfactual solution must include the claim that omissions are 
causes. However, it is not evident that omissions must be taken as causes. One reason 
for this could be that omissions are not events, as Loewer has mentioned. Thus, 
omissions may not fit the ontology of causation that takes events as causal relata. 
Further, Kim's third objection can also serve as a reason for denying omissions as 
causes. I am not sure whether these are really strong reasons—at least I don't see why 
people who accept the dependence conception must count omissions as causes. 
Certainly, it is costly for them to deny omissions as causes, since it is giving up a 
purported advantage of the dependence conception of causation over the production 
conception that dependence, but not production, can account for omissions. If so； 
Kim's third objection may be revised into the following dilemma: 
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1) If the dependence conception accommodates omissions as causes, it would count 
too many such causes; thus, it is not the right conception for understanding mental 
causation. 
2) If the dependence conception does not accommodate omissions, it has no 
advantage over the production conception concerning omissions. 
C) Either dependence is not the right conception for understanding mental causation, 
or it has no advantage over the production conception concerning omissions. 
I suspect that non-reductive physicalists might want to reject the second premise. But, 
until now, I do not see how a non-reductive physicalist could reasonably reject any one 
of the premises. Therefore, I have to conclude that Kim's third objection to the 
counterfactual solution is successful. 
What about Kim's second objection? I think some cases of agency do not fit Kim's 
idea of agency. Consider the following example: 
After finishing a take-home mid-term exam, Susan asked Vincent 
to hand in a mid-term paper to Prof. Shun for her. Vincent, 
however, took the chance to take revenge on Susan for having 
bullied him several months ago. Thus, although he had given a 
verbal promise to Susan, he chose not to hand in the paper for 
her, but stayed in his room and did nothing. Susan thus ended up 
failing the mid-term exam. 
In this case, intuitively, Vincent was clearly exhibiting his own agency, although there is 
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no causal process linking up the cause and the effect that exhibits a continuous 
spatial-temporal process. If so, it is the production conception of Kim that fails to 
account for this case, since there is no spatio-temporally continuous process linking up 
the cause and the effect. Rather, the dependence conception can well account for the 
fact that Vincent's intention to take revenge caused Susan to fail the mid-term, since 
the following should be true: 
"If Vincent had not had the intention to take revenge, Susan would not have failed the 
mid-term." 
Therefore, it seems to me that while counterfactuals might not account for some 
paradigmatic cases of agency, they do account for some cases that production fails to 
account for. 
However, it does not seem that counterfactual solutions can claim full 
vindication concerning the supervenience/exclusion argument, since it is still 
conceptually clear that counterfactual dependence and influence do not capture the 
idea of production/generation. The idea of production/ generation should be crucial for 
describing the most paradigmatic cases of agency, such as those pointed out by Kim. 
My feeling hungry caused me to go out to buy a hot dog; my desire to watch the NBA 
final caused me to switch on the TV, and the TV show caused my feeling of excitement 
afterwards. These cases do exhibit a spatial-temporally continuous process of causation, 
such that only production can fully account for them. If so, while the following is false: 
(P I ) All cases of agency require production; 
the following should be true: 
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(P2) Some cases of agency require production. 
Indeed, the cases that the counterfactual account fails to account for are paradigmatic 
cases of agency; to a non-reductive physicalist, this observation should be troubling 
enough.43 
4.5 Conclusion 
If what is written above is correct, there is no reason to think that the production 
conception is problematic. Rather, while Kim's reasons for using the production 
conception can hardly be conclusive, the production conception seems to be the more 
appropriate conception for formulating the supervenience/exclusion argument. Also, 
while counterfactual solutions do save some cases of mental causation and even some 
cases of agency, they save very few. 
If my arguments are correct, the counterfactual solution does not provide 
non-reductive physicalists with a good response to the supervenience/exclusion 
argument. 
43 I want to add a point to clarify my view and avoid possible misunderstanding. While I argue, on behalf 
of Kim, that we need the production conception of causation to account for some cases of agency, I do 
not mean that production conception is only needed to account for agency. I take no stance on whether 
production is necessary to account for some other cases of causation. Indeed, the issue of whether 
production is necessary to account for other cases of causation is not relevant to my thesis. 
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Chapter 5: Does Yablo's determination proposal 
help to solve the exclusion problem for 
non-reductive physicalism? 
In the last chapter, we evaluated the attempt to resist the supervenience/exclusion 
argument by appealing to the dependence conception of causation. My conclusion was 
that this is not a satisfactory solution, since it is of little help in accounting for many 
cases of agency. 
In this chapter, I will discuss another possible response to the exclusion argument, 
namely, Yablo's determination hypothesis. Yablo thinks that he has a good solution to 
cure "epiphobia"; i.e., "the fear that one is turning into an epiphenomenalist" (Yablo 
1997: 251). Unlike Kim, Yablo thinks that we should not think of mental causes as 
competing for the causal role with the underlying physical causes in cases of 
mental-physical causation. Why is that? Yablo's answer is that the mental causes 
should be understood as the determinable of the underlying physical events, and 
determinables do not compete for causal roles with the determinants ,� 
Many questions naturally arise. What are determinables and determinants? Why 
is it the case that two events (or, more accurately, the properties involved in the two 
events) do not compete for the causal role if they are related as determinables and 
determinates?'^^ Furthermore, are the relevant mental events and physical events 
44 The determination relation is primarily a relation between properties. Yablo thinks that the 
determination relation can also be understood as a relation between events. For details, see the 
discussion below. See, especially, footnote 46. 
I see some others using the word "determinants." As I see, determinants are the same as 
determinates. I will use the two words interchangeably. 
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really related in that way? 
I will consider whether Yablo's idea of thes exclusion problem gives a plausible 
way for non-reductive physicalism to resist the exclusion argument. 
5.1. Yablo's idea elaborated 
In the first few chapters, I formulated the exclusion argument as a valid argument. If 
Kim's argument were sound, then the only options for non-reductive physicalists are: 
(1) to embrace all of the premises of the argument and become reductive physicalists, 
and (2) to deny at least one of the premises in the argument. Yablo seems to accept the 
mental/physical distinction (Yablo 1992: 248, 250). Presumably, this indicates that he 
does not accept reductive physicalism. If so, he has to deny at least one premise. The 
only choice of premise for Yablo to deny should be the exclusion principle. Indeed, the 
exclusion principle seems to be what he wants to deny. He said: 
...the exclusion principle is badly overdrawn. Not that there is 
nothing right about it... any credible reconstruction of the 
exclusion principle must respect the truism that determinates do 
not contend with their determinables for causal influence. 
(Yablo 1992: 259) 
Yablo characterized the exclusion principle in this way: 
[F]or every irreflexive relation R (every "form of non-identity"), 
and every R-related pair x and x*, x's causal sufficiency for an 
effect entails x*'s causal irrelevance. 
89 
He thinks that if the exclusion principle is characterized in this way, it is clearly wrong. 
While Yablo might not intend to respond to Kim's exclusion argument, we may still 
consider whether Yablo's response can provide a solution to deny Kim's causal 
exclusion principle. Let us consider Kim's principle: 
"No single event can have more than one sufficient cause occurring at any given 
time—unless it is a genuine case of causal overdetermination." 
One major point that Yablo wants to make is that if two purported (sufficient) causes 
are related as determinate and determinable, the causal sufficiency of one of them 
does not mean that another one cannot be a cause of the same effect. Let us examine 
the story that Yablo used to illustrate his point. 
Imagine a pigeon, Sophie, conditioned to peck at red to the 
exclusion of other colors; a red triangle is presented, and Sophie 
pecks. Most people would say that the redness was causally 
relevant to her pecking, even that this was a paradigm case of 
causal relevance ... the triangle in question was a specific shade 
of red, scarlet. Assuming that the scarlet was causally sufficient 
for the pecking, we can conclude by the exclusion that every 
other property was irrelevant... the redness, although it looked 
to be precisely what Sophie was responding to, makes in reality 
no causal contribution whatever. (Yablo 1992: 257) 
Scarletness and redness is a paradigm case of the determination relation, in which 
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scarletness is the determinate and redness the determinable. By using this example, 
Yablo wants to show that even if the property of scarletness (or the exemplification of 
it, or the event having this property, etc.) is causally sufficient for Sophie's pecking, still, 
other properties can also be causally relevant to Sophie's pecking. In this case, based 
on our intuition, we see that redness is also causally relevant to the effect. If so, it 
seems, at first sight, that an effect can have more than one sufficient cause at the same 
time, even though it is not a genuine case of overdetermination. If this is true and if 
physical properties really determine mental properties in the same way as scarletness 
determines redness, then mental events should not be competing for causal roles. 
Rather, the correct picture of mental-physical causation should be quite different. As 
Yablo said: 
Thinking of causal influence as something that an effect's 
would-be causal antecedents compete over in a zero-sum game, 
the exclusion principle looks not unreasonable. If the causally 
sufficient antecedent monopolizes all the influence, then the 
others are left with none. To judge by the examples, though, 
causation is not like that: rather than competing for causal 
honors, determinables and their determinates seem likelier to 
share in one another's success. (Yablo 1992: 272) 
5.1.1 Yablo's argument for the determination proposal 
However, are the mental and physical related in that way? Yablo argues that they are. 
Now let's see what Yablo regards as the determination relation. Primarily, 
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d e t e r m i n a t i o n is a re lat ion b e t w e e n p r o p e r t i e s , in S o p h i e ' s case, S c a r l e t n e s s is t h e 
p r o p e r t y that d e t e r m i n e s R e d n e s s . Y a b l o f u r t h e r c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
re lat ion as fo l lows , g i v e n t h a t P a n d Q are propert ies : 
(A) P d e t e r m i n e s Q if for a t h i n g to be P is for a t h i n g to be Q, not s impl ic i ter , but in a 
spec i f ic w a y . (Yab lo 1992: 252) 
A n d 
(B) P d e t e r m i n e s Q o n l y if: 
(i) necessar i ly , for all x, if x h a d P, t h e n x has Q; a n d 
(ii) poss ib ly , for s o m e x, x has Q but lacks P.^^ (Yab lo 1992: 252) 
T h e t w o c o n d i t i o n s in (B) are not suf f ic ient for d e t e r m i n a t i o n . T h e y o n l y c o n s t i t u t e a 
re lat ion ca l led a s y m m e t r i c a l necess i ta t ion . T h i s re lat ion is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n for 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 
Y a b l o f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t phys ica l p r o p e r t i e s d e t e r m i n e m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s (in t h e 
f o l l o w i n g , I wi l l cal l th is a r g u m e n t t h e " d e t e r m i n a t i o n p r o p o s a l " ) . He t h i n k s t h a t as 
m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s are s u p e r v e n i e n t o n a n d mul t ip ly rea l i zed by phys ica l properties； w e 
Some others (see Ehring 1996 and Walter 2007) think that determination can also be a relation 
between predicates. Yablo also extended the determination relation to events (in Yablo 1992). I think 
that it is reasonable to take determination as a relation between predicates, as well as a relation 
between properties. 
If determination is a relation between properties, both redness and scarletness have to be properties 
given that scarletness determines redness. People, such as ID. M. Armstrong, who think that there are no 
determinable properties would say that only scarletness is a property (if it is a super-determinate), but 
redness is not. It seems to me that if determination is a relation only between properties, then 
Armstrong has to admit that the sentence "scarletness determines redness" is either false or 
meaningless. I do not want to go against Armstrong, so I tend to think that determination is not only a 
relation between predicates. However, I am willing to admit that my reason is hardly conclusive. 
47 X, according to Yablo, should be taken as a variable of an event. Please note that Yablo's ontological 
framework is different from Kim's; his view of events is a Davidsonian view. 
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have good grounds to think that physical properties determine mental properties. 
According to Yablo, mental properties are supervenient on physical properties in the 
following sense: 
(S) Necessarily, for every x and every mental property M of x, x has some physical 
property P such that necessarily all Ps are Ms. (Yablo 1992: 254) 
Concerning the multiple realizability of mental properties, while the following need not 
be a definition of this concept, it is enough for "refuting the identity theory." Therefore, 
in this context, Yablo thinks that it is enough to understand the multiple realizability of 
mental properties as follows: 
(M) Necessarily, for every mental property M, and every physical property P which 
necessitates M, possibly something possesses M but not P. (Yablo 1992: 255) 
(S) and (M) together guarantee that mental properties are asymmetrically necessitated 
by physical properties. This, according to Yablo, "calls out for explanation, and the one 
that comes first to mind is that mental/physical relations are a species of 
determinable/determinate relations" (Yablo 1992: 256). Therefore, although Yablo 
would probably also agree that he does not have a conclusive argument showing that 
physical properties determine mental properties, the determination proposal fits quite 
well with what all physicalists agree on, so this suggestion is one that is worth serious 
consideration. If it is also theoretically fruitful, then physicalists should have very good 
reasons to accept this suggestion. 
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So far, we have seen how Yablo has argued t h a t first, if x determines y， t h e n 
even though x is causally sufficient for a certain effect, x does not render y causally 
irrelevant to that effect; second, physical properties determine mental properties. 
Third, together with the idea that two properties are identical only if they are 
co-extensive he suggests that mental and physical properties are not identical, such 
that the mental/physical distinction is also preserved (Yablo 1992: 251). 
5.1.2 The primacy of the causal status of mental events^^ 
If Yablo's arguments work, they show that physicalists need not worry about physical 
events rendering mental events causally irrelevant. Yablo wants to achieve even more. 
He wants to argue that mental events really are causally relevant; furthermore, 
compared with the underlying physical events, mental events are usually in a better 
position to be the cause of a physical effect in cases of mental-physical causation. His 
argument is as follows: 
Yablo thinks that proportionality is an important constraint on causation. 
Proportionality, according to Yablo, can be characterized as follows: 
48 I think that it is also acceptable to take x and y as events or properties. As noted above, we can take 
the determination relation as primarily a relation between properties. If so, it would not be too difficult 
to extend the relation to be a relation between events. Indeed, Yablo characterized the "determination 
relation for events" as follows: 
(C) p determines q if: for p to occur (in a possible world) is for q to occur (there), not simpliciter, but in a 
certain way (Yablo 1992: 260). In section 5 of (Yablo 1992), Yablo further explicated the idea of inclusion 
between events (or the essence of events) by appealing to the individual essence between events. So far, 
I do not have any reason to dispute that idea. As I see it, that idea is also consistent with the Kimian view 
of events; i.e., a substance's instantiation of a property at a certain time t. Therefore, I find that the 
notion of "determination relation for events" is intelligible, even under the metaphysical framework of 
Kim. 
49 Please note that in the following, when I talk about events, I will be understanding events in the way 
that Yablo does in his 1992 paper, which is a Davidsonian view. His view takes an event as a particular 
that can instantiate properties, some of which are essential to the event, and some of which are 
accidental. Also, one event can include another. Hence, the event "I am wearing a scarlet T-shirt" can 
include the event "I am wearing a red T-shirt". 
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(P) "When...y is contingent on x, and requires it, and x is adequate, and enough for y, x 
will be proportional to y . � (Yablo 1992: 277) 
Given that x and y are events, by "contingent/' "adequate/' "require/' and "enough/' 
Yablo means the following respectively: 
(Contingent) If x had not occurred, then y would not have occurred either. (Yablo 1992: 
274) 
(Adequate) If x had not occurred, then if it had, y would have occurred as well. (Yablo 
1992:274) 
(Required) For all x- < x, if x- had occurred without x, then y would not have occurred. 
(Yablo 1992: 276) 
(Enough) For all x+ > x, x+ was not required for y. (Yablo 1992: 277) 
By ">", Yablo means the following, given any events p and q: 
(L) p>q only if : 
(i) necessarily, if p exists, then q exists and is coincident with p; 
(ii) possibly, q exists and p does not exist. (Yablo 1992: 265) 
Indeed, (L) is Yablo's characterization of the determination relation between two 
events, which is quite parallel to his characterization of the determination relation 
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between properties. In his earlier writing, Yablo seemed to deny that proportionality is 
a necessary condition of causation (Yablo 1992: 277) "because of the problems of 
preemption, overdetermination, and so on ..." (Yablo 1992: 277 fn. 60). But in some 
later writing, he claimed that "causes must be proportional to their effects" (Yablo 
1997: 254). Setting aside the question of whether this is a necessary condition of 
causation, Yablo's view is clear on the following point: if there are two candidates for 
the cause of a certain effect, and one of them is proportional to the effect but the 
other is not, then the one that is proportional to the effect and not the other should be 
the cause of the effect. 
Yablo thinks that, usually, the underlying physical event incorporates too much 
detail to be the cause of the effect. In Yablo's terms, the physical event is not required 
(Yablo 1992: 278). The mental event, however, is proportional to the effect. Thus, we 
should conclude that, while the physical event and the mental event do not compete 
for the causal role, they do compete for the status to be the cause, and the winner in 
the competition should be the mental event. 
To sum up, Yablo contends that (1) mental properties are determinables of 
physical properties; (2) if (1) is true, then mental properties and physical properties do 
not compete for the causal role, since the exclusion principle should not apply to cases 
in which the two purported causes are related as determinate and determinable; (3) 
given that the mental event and the physical event are related as determinable and 
determinate and that they are purported to be the cause of an effect, the mental 
should be the cause in a case of mental-physical causation since the mental event is 
proportional to the effect, but the physical event is not. 
5.2 Evaluating Yablo's idea 
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To a physicalist Yablo's idea is very appealing. First of all, Yablo's idea guarantees the 
causal status of mental properties. Second, it does not deprive the physical realm of 
self-sufficiency. It makes good sense of how the mental realm depends on, and is 
determined by, the physical realm. However, I do not think that his idea is really 
persuasive. Indeed, his idea is defective in many ways. 
5.2.1 Are mental properties determinables of physical properties? 
Many have argued that mental properties are not determinables of physical properties; 
for example, Douglas Ehring (1996); Sara Worley (1997); Eric Funkhouser (2006); and 
Sven Walter (2007). I find their arguments quite persuasive. To argue against Yablo's 
first contention, I would only raise one point instead of repeating all of the arguments 
of the others. 
First of all, I want to further clarify what the determination relation is. I briefly 
discussed this subject above when formulating Yablo's view. The above formulation, 
which is Yablo's formulation, is inadequate. He takes the following view of the 
determination relation: 
(A) P determines Q if for a thing to be P is for a thing to be Q, not simpliciter, but in a 
specific way. (Yablo 1992: 252) 
According to Funkhouser, this characterization does not make it clear that a 
determination relation, contrary to Yablo's view that it should only be taken as a 
metaphysical relation, does have a conceptual constraint. The conceptual constraint is 
that, given that F is a determinable of H I and H2, both H I and H2 must be F in virtue of 
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their specific F-ness. This is a constraint on what "a specific way" amounts to. This 
constraint is noted in some earlier formulations by W. C Johnson and A. N. Prior. For 
example, according to Prior: 
Determinates under the same determinable have the common 
relational property presupposing no other relation between the 
determinates themselves, of characterizing whatever they do 
characterize in a certain respect. Redness, blueness, etc., all 
characterise objects as we say, "in respect of their colour"; 
triangularity, squareness, etc., "in respect of their shape." And 
this is surely quite fundamental to the notion of being a 
determinate under a determinable. (Prior 1949: 13) 
Now, the most widely accepted, and arguably the best, account of the determination 
relation is the one proposed by Eric Funkhouser (Funkhouser 2 0 0 6 ) . A c c o r d i n g to 
Funkhouser, the most central idea of the determination is that having a determinate 
property is to have a determinable that "falls under in a specific way." Crimsonness and 
scarletness are determinates of redness, since "being scarlet" and "being crimson" are 
both being red in a specific way. Determinates of, say, redness； are only different in the 
relevant sets of dimensions—hue, brightness, and saturation—that are "minimally 
sufficient criteria according to which all different kinds of redness can be distinguished 
from the others" (Funkhouser 2006: 551). 
Those relevant sets of dimensions that are minimally sufficient criteria according 
to which all determinates of P can be distinguished from the other determinates of P 
5° Funkhouser's account seems to be the standard account of determination. See Tim Crane (2008) and 
Peter Menzies (2008). 
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are called determination dimensions. Therefore, determinates of P are different with 
respect to their P-ness; i.e., determinates of P are all different P, and they differ 
according to the determination dimensions.^^ 
Funkhouser's account of determination is much more complicated and subtle than 
the account presented above. The above account suffices for my purpose of evaluating 
Yablo's idea.52 Given the above clarification, it is clear that mental properties cannot 
be determinable properties if we have a literal understanding of the determination 
relation. The reason for this is that mental properties do not have the same 
determination dimensions with physical properties. Take pain as an example. Some 
crucial determination dimensions would include the sharpness of the pain and the 
specific feeling of the pain (e.g., the feeling of a pain caused by a punch and the feeling 
of a pain caused by fire are two different specific feelings of pain). However, no 
physical properties are different in these ways. 
What about Yablo's argument for his determination proposal? Yablo also admits 
that supervenience and the multiple realizability of the mental do not provide 
conclusive support for his determination proposal, as his argument, even if successful, 
only shows that mental properties are asymmetrically necessitated by physical 
properties, which is not sufficient for determination.^^ 
Given the inconclusive support for the determination proposal, and the counter 
51 See Funkhouser(2006: 551). 
52 For those who are interested in a complete account of the determination relation, see Eric 
Funkhouser (2008). 
" I n d e e d , I have strong doubts about whether supervenience and the multiple realizability of the 
mental support the asymmetrical necessitation thesis that is necessary for determination. The reason for 
this is that, given the standard characterization of realization given by Kim, the modal force of the 
second modal operator in the mind-body supervenience thesis should be nomological necessity, instead 
of metaphysical necessity. See (Kim 1998: 20-23). It is the same with the modal operator in the 
realization thesis—the physical properties necessitating the mental properties should be necessitating 
them nomologically. 
I have noticed that some disagree with Kim on the characterization of realization. As this matter is not 
crucial to my ongoing discussion, I will not expend too much effort on arguing this point. 
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arguments against it, I conclude that the determination proposal, if taken literally, 
should be false. 
5.2.2 The story is not ended. The crux of the issue is not whether the 
determination proposal is literally true 
I see that many others have argued for the above conclusion that mental properties are 
not literally determined by physical properties. Their arguments are convincing, but not 
surprising. Indeed, Yablo would likely not find them surprising either. When faced with 
the objection that the relation between pain and C-fiber firing (Ci) is significantly 
different from the genuine determination relation between red and scarlet, in his Wide 
Causation, he said: 
Admittedly, the pain/Ci: red/scarlet analogy isn't perfect. That 
doesn't concern me, unless the disanalogies are such as to make 
pain more causally competitive with C l , than colors are with their 
shades. As far as I can see, all that "Y is a determinate of X" needs 
to mean ... is that Y necessitates X (not because it has a 
metaphysically infallible way of bringing X about but) because X is 
immanent in or included in Y. This is all it takes to kill the 
appearance of causal competition. (Yablo 1997: 275 fn. 22) 
Clearly, Yablo does not care whether the determination proposal is literally correct, 
since he thinks that it is unnecessary to care about this issue. The real proposal in 
Yablo's mind is not the determination proposal (literally understood), but the idea that 
mental properties (events) are immanent in or included in physical properties (events). 
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The question naturally arises: Even if the mental event is included in the physical 
event, the properties constituting the mental event need not be the causally relevant 
ones; therefore, what guarantees that the mental event is causally relevant? Yablo's 
answer, as mentioned above, is that we should consider the proportionality constraint, 
and the cause proportional to the effect should be the mental event, but not the 
physical event. Hence, the mental event is not only causally relevant, but should also 
be the cause of the effect. 
Yablo thinks that the proportionality constraint helps to guarantee that mental 
events do cause the effects. I think his idea is problematic in many ways. First of all, as 
with many others, I have many questions on the proportionality constraint. For 
example, why should there be such a constraint on causation? While the 
proportionality constraint is quite intuitive in some cases, it is not that intuitive in other 
cases. Some people have argued, and I agree, that there should be no such constraint 
at a l l . S u p p o s e that Mary is screaming at 90 db and hence the glass shatters. Suppose 
we know that as long as someone is screaming at 70 db or more, the glass must shatter. 
Would we really conclude that the statement that "Mary's screaming at 90 db caused 
the glass to shatter" is wrong?^^ I think an intuitive answer is that Mary's screaming is 
the cause. Hence, at the very least, whether the proportionality constraint is intuitive is 
dubious. Cases such as the one above make the proportionality constraint appear too 
restrictive in the sense that it rules out events that could properly be counted as causes. 
Also, in a genuine case of overdetermination, neither of the two purported causes is 
proportional to the effect (since none of them are required). If we take the 
proportionality constraint as a necessary condition of causation, the result is that in a 
genuine case of overdetermination, there should be no cause! This is obviously absurd. 
See, for example, (Walter 2007: 237-238). Walter's claim is that the proportionality constraint is false. 
A similar example can be found in (Walter 2007: 237-238). 
101 
Furthermore, is the conception of causation constrained by proportionality? If 
there really is such a conception, is it one that is relevant to the debate on mental 
causation? As Kim has argued； agency requires the production conception of causation. 
The conception of causation (not fully) characterized by the proportionality constraint 
does not seem to capture the idea that the cause produces or generates the effect. At 
this moment, I do not claim that Kim must be correct, but why should we think that 
Yablo is right? Why should we think that Yablo's conception is more relevant to the 
issue than Kim's production conception? 
These are interesting and difficult questions. However I want to deal with another 
issue. What I want to argue is that even if we grant that a cause must be proportional 
to the effect, or that a purported cause that is proportional to the effect is in a better 
position to be the cause than the one that is not proportional, it does not help the 
non-reductive physicalists to guarantee that the non-physical, mental event is the cause 
of the effect. To make my point plain, I will argue that Yablo's proposal is a reductive 
view in disguise. 
5.2.3 Why is proportionality constraint not the solution? 
To begin with, let us consider the following case: 
Benson is attending a lesson in a classroom. When Benson is 
listening, a group of neuroscientists are monitoring everything 
about Benson's physical condition; hence, they know everything 
about what is going on in Benson's body. After hearing the 
question from the teacher, Benson wants to answer the question. 
Thus, he raises his hand. At the same time, the neuroscientists see 
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the underlying physical process. Actually, Benson's raising his 
hand is generated by his brain-state-type-B, which transmits 80 
units of energy to his nerve-N，Hence, once again, there are two 
purported causes for Benson's raising his hand (call this effect e), 
namely, Benson's desire to answer the teacher (call it m), and 
Benson's brain-state-type-B at that moment (call it b). 
How would Yablo interpret this case? I want to make it clear what Yablo has to argue 
for in this case if he wants to solve the exclusion problem for non-reductive physicalism 
using his strategy. Certainly, he has to argue for the following: 
(1) m is proportional to e. 
(2) b is not proportional to e. 
For the sake of argument, I may grant that both (1) and (2) are true. I may also grant 
that m is determined by b in the sense of the determination stipulated by Yablo (call it 
Y-determination). The non-reductive physicalists who want to solve the exclusion 
problem through Yablo's proposal should accept more propositions than (1) and (2). 
Since, for non-reductive physicalists, m has to be non-physical, they have to argue that: 
(3) m is not a physical event. 
How, according to Yablo, can m be a non-physical event? m cannot be non-physical in 
56 The case is artificial, and the language would be quite different from that used by neuro-scientists. But 
it should be sufficient for illustrating my point. 
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virtue of having a specific non-physical property M. Since m is included in b, if m 
possesses M (and is thus non-physical), b also possesses M and b has to be 
non-physical as well. However, b should be a physical event. Yablo's strategy is that m 
is non-physical because m lacks the relevant properties to make it physical. According 
to Yablo: 
...it is clear that if there is an essential difference between mental 
events and physical ones, it is not that physical events' essences 
are mentally impoverished. Instead, I suggest, it is the other way 
around: the essences of mental events are physically 
impoverished. (Yablo 1992: 268) 
Whether (3) can be correct depends on (4), namely: 
(4) There is no physical event that is proportional to e. 
However, I think that (4) is extremely dubious. Let us suppose, as Yablo probably would, 
that b "incorporates enormous amounts of causally extraneous detail"; hence, b is not 
required for e and thus is not proportional to e. Still, a physicalist should find it 
plausible to suppose that there is a physical event that is Y-determined by b, which is 
equivalent or similar to the following candidates: 
Event b l : Benson's being in a brain-state that is transmitting at least 40 units of energy 
to nerve N. 
Event b2: Benson's being in a brain-state that is transmitting some energy to some 
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nerve p. 
Please note that both b l and b2 are Y-determined by b. Plausibly, b2 should be not 
enough (in Yablo's sense) to be the cause of e. B u t still, both b l and b2 do not seem to 
be physically impoverished!^^ If so, for a physicalist, it is plausible that there is a 
physical event that is Y-determined by b and proportional to e. 
If there is a physical event, let us say b l , which is proportional to e, and m is 
proportional to e, then m should be equivalent to b l . Since both m and b l are 
determined by b, they should occupy the very same spatial-temporal location. Since 
both m and b l are proportional to e, m and b l should have the very same essence, i.e., 
the very same set of essential property(ies). Otherwise, at least one of the two (i.e., m 
and b l ) should be either not required (for possessing too much detail) or not enough 
(for possessing too little). Since the events are as they are in virtue of their essence, i.e. 
their property(ies), m's being a mental event and b l ' s being a physical event is because 
of the very same essence. What this means is that Benson's being in a brain-state that 
is transmitting at least 40 units of energy to nerve N is the very same event as Benson's 
wanting to answer the teacher, as they possess the very same essence. If so, what 
follows is that being in a brain-state that is transmitting at least 40 units of energy to 
nerve N should be the same property as wanting to answer the teacher. This is none 
other than the type-type identity theory, a version of reductionism.^^ 
“Certainly, the set of "physical" is broadly construed to include the biological and neuro-physiological. 
58 The formal version of the argument is as follows: 
(1) m, which is a mental event, causes e 
(2) If m causes e, m is proportional to e. (Yablo's view on causation.) 
(3) m is proportional to e. (From 1 and 2.) 
(4) b l is proportional to e. (A premise that physicalists should find plausible.) 
(5) Both m and b l are determined by b. 
(6) If both m and b l are determined by b, and both of them are proportional to e, then they should 
possess the same property. 
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The above reasoning, I suspect, can be generalized to all cases of mental-physical 
causation in which the purported mental causes are proportional to the effect. Hence, 
if my argument works, then those mental causes are the causes simply because the 
relevant mental properties are physical properties. This is not tolerable for 
non-reductive physicalists. If so, appealing to the proportionality constraint would not 
be of much help to them. 
As I see it, the only option that Yablo has if he were to deny my conclusion is to 
deny my premise that there is a physical event equally proportional to the effect. In 
appealing to this premise am I begging the question? I don't think so. First of all, as 
mentioned, it is easy to conceive of a physical event that is not enough to bring about 
Benson's raising his hand and determined by b. I can provide one more example: 
Benson's brain is functioning. This event is obviously Y-determined by b and obviously 
not enough for e, since a functioning brain can be an improperly functioning brain that 
cannot bring about the raising of one's hand. Given that an event can be too 
impoverished to be enough for e, still, it is not impoverished enough to be non-physical. 
While I do not think that it is impossible to conceive of an event that is too 
impoverished to be physical, such as an event's being self-identical, it is extremely hard 
to conceive of an event that is rich enough to be proportional to a physical effect, but 
impoverished enough not to be non-physical. Such an event seems inconceivable to me. 
At best, it might only be a conceptual possibility. If Yablo thinks that his solution can 
really solve the exclusion problem for non-reductive physicalists, it is his responsibility 
(7) m and b l possess the same property. (From 3, 4, 5, 6.) 
(8) m possesses property M, in virtue of which m is proportional to e and mental. 
(9) b l possesses property Bl, in virtue of which b l is proportional to e and physical 
So, (10) M = Bl. (From 1. 8, 9.) 
As I see it, Yablo is committed to all of the premises except for (4). However, I argue that denying 4 is a 
very counter-intuitive move. When I say in premise (8) that m is mental in virtue of possessing M, I do 
not mean that M makes m non-physical. Rather, what I said there is neutral on the issue of whether the 
property that makes m mental will also make m non-physical. 
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to show that such an event is, at least, conceivable. 
Hence, if my argument works, Yablo's proposal, i.e. his own determination 
proposal and the appeal to the proportionality constraint, boils down to type-type 
reductionism. Thus, it fails to cure the epiphobia of people who are unwilling to give up 
non-reductive physicalism. 
5.3 Does Yablo's view falsify the causal exclusion principle? 
So far, I have argued that Yablo's determination proposal (or Y-determination proposal) 
does not provide a good solution for non-reductive physicalism to solve the exclusion 
problem. However, does it show that the exclusion argument of Kim is unsound by 
showing that the principle of causal exclusion is false? Furthermore, if the causal 
exclusion principle is shown by the determination relation to be false, does it help the 
non-reductive physicalists to resist Kim's argument? Before I end this chapter, I think 
that this question should be discussed. Below, are some of my comments. 
First of all, even if we grant that the determination relation does show that the 
exclusion principle is false, this issue has very little significance for the debate on 
mental causation. This is because of what the determination relation does not 
show—namely, that if mental and physical properties are not related in that way, then 
there would be no exclusion. It could be the case that only if mental and physical 
properties are related as determinates and determinables will there be no exclusion 
between them. If that is the case, non-reductive physicalists are still troubled by the 
exclusion argument, or a slightly revised version of it, as most of them agree that 
physical properties do not determine mental properties in that way. 
Second, I do not think that the determination relation has shown that the causal 
exclusion principle is false. The reason for this is that, based on our discussion in 
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chapter 3, we can see that, by "two distinct causes/' Kim should mean "two causes that 
have their own causal role, and their causal roles are non-overlapping." At least, this 
understanding of the causal exclusion principle flows naturally from Kim's view on 
causation. If so, a determinate cause and a determinable cause clearly fail to be distinct 
causes in that sense. While Kim never said this explicitly, I suspect that he would take 
the scarletness and redness of the triangle in Yablo's case as the very same cause with 
different descriptions, or regard one of them as part of the other. Indeed, it is not 
unintuitive to think that there is only one cause there. 
What if we do not accept Kim's view on causation? If there are good reasons not to 
accept Kim's view on causation in the mental causation debate, does it follow that we 
will conclude that either the causal exclusion principle characterized by Kim is 
irrelevant to the issue, or that Kim's way of understanding the principle is not correct? 
Even if it does follow, are there such reasons? In the above discussion, I have explained 
in chapters 3 and 4 why I find Kim's view on causation to be reasonable, as well as why 
I find Yablo's view on causation unattractive. Hence, as I see it, there are no such good 
reasons. Hence, even if it does follow, this does not matter to the whole issue. 
Hence, I conclude that determination relation does not show that Kim's causal 
exclusion principle is false. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Kim has argued that physicalists have only two choices: to save mental causation and 
embrace reductive physicalism, or to deny mental causation by accepting 
epiphenomenalism. My discussion on Yablo's proposal seems to have confirmed Kim's 
view. Yablo's view tempts us to think that his determination proposal may provide 
non-reductive physicalists with a way of saving mental causation without embracing 
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reductionism, simply because Yablo's proposal is a reductive physicalism in disguise. 
Furthermore, while Yablo's idea is strikingly original and creative, it is dubious in many 
ways. For example, his presupposition that there are determinable properties that can 
be causally relevant； his argument for his determination proposal, his unpopular view 
on causation to the effect that a cause should be proportional to the effect, and so on. 
A more serious problem, I think, is that even from a physicalist perspective, it does not 
appear to be a realistic proposal. When we consider a mundane case of 
mental-physical causation, there can hardly be a mental event that satisfies all of the 
requirements in Yablo's proposal. 
To conclude, Yablo's proposal does not help to cure the epiphobia of a 
clear-headed non-reductive physicalist. 
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Chapter 6: The final conclusion—the exclusion 
problem remains unsolved 
After a long journey, it is time to sum up our discussion in the last few chapters. 
In chapter 1,1 set the stage for the discussion on our topic, namely, the exclusion 
problem for non-reductive physicalism. I clarified non-reductive and reductive 
physicalism, and introduced the basic concepts for the discussion. 
In chapter 2,1 formulated the updated version of Jaegwon Kim's 
supervenience/exclusion argument. In formulating the argument, it became clear that 
Kim's argument is valid, and that all of its premises, with the exception of the causal 
exclusion principle, are the basic commitments of non-reductive physicalism. I also 
introduced the major responses to Kim's argument. 
In light of chapter 2, we can expect the truth of the causal exclusion principle to be 
crucial to the debate on the exclusion problem for non-reductive physicalism. Thus, in 
chapter 3 I articulated Kim's reason for that crucial principle. The main point of chapter 
3 was to show that Kim's principle is motivated by his view on causation, his view that a 
cause produces or generates the effect through a spatial-temporally continuous 
process, and that a cause must have a specific causal contribution to the effect. 
In chapter 4,1 discussed one proposed solution to the exclusion problem—the 
idea that the exclusion problem can be solved by appealing to the dependence 
conception of causation. I argued that Barry Loewer did not provide good reasons for 
denying the use of the production conception of causation in formulating the 
supervenience/exclusion argument. Furthermore, I argued that Kim did have some 
good reasons for rejecting the counterfactual solution, even though I admitted that 
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there are some limitations to his view. The limitation is that the production conception 
of causation fails to account for some cases of agency. I also admitted that the 
dependence conception could account for those cases, but noted that it accounts for 
too little. 
In Chapter 5, I evaluated Yablo's determination proposal, I argued that on the one 
hand, Yablo's proposal does not provide a viable solution to solving the exclusion 
problem for non-reductive physicalism, since his proposal should be understood as a 
type-identity theory, which is one version of reductive physicalism; on the other hand, 
as a response to Kim's exclusion argument, it does not show that the causal exclusion 
principle is false. 
If my arguments in the chapters above were correct, then both the counterfactual 
solution and the determination proposal do not help to save non-reductive physicalism, 
or at least, they do not save enough of it. 
I notice that my arguments in the above chapter could not cover all the responses 
to Kim's supervenience/exclusion argument. Indeed, I see some new solutions 
emerging, such as Peter Menzies' attempts to solve the exclusion problem by 
developing a new account of causation.^^ I also see some new suggestions on the 
relation between the mental and the physical. For example, Sydney Shoemaker®^ has 
put forward a new account of physical realization in order to avoid the exclusion 
argument. Furthermore, there are responses to those responses already.^^ Since my 
thesis does not cover those discussions, even though I think that the exclusion problem 
is still unsolved, this does not mean that there are no good solutions to the problem. 
Still, I think that my arguments have shown that while the exclusion problem 
might not be an intractable one, it does indeed pose a difficult task for the 
59 See Menzies (2003). 
See Shoemaker (2007). 
61 See Kim (2010). 
Ill 
non-reductive physicalist. This, to a great extent, is due to the neat and forceful 
formulation of the supervenience/exclusion argument by Jaegwon Kim, and his 
penetrating discussion on the topic. 
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